During the four years examined by the monitor, Honduran justice institutions, with the exception of the public defender's offices, experienced an increase in personnel and geographic coverage. However, the number of judges, forensic doctors, prosecutors and public defenders per 100,000 inhabitants is below the world average and tends to weigh in urban areas.

Ensuring that competent, qualified personnel are serving in Honduras’s justice sector requires transparent, merit-based selection processes. However, selection processes for justice officials were highly vulnerable to external influence and political pressure. Despite some positive reforms to the process (related to suitability criteria, gender parity and holding public hearings), the 2016 election of Supreme Court magistrates lacked transparency, accountability, and was heavily politicized.

While the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary experienced increases in their budgets from 2014 to 2017, funding remains low and disproportionate when compared to the budgets allocated to the defense and public security sectors during the same period. In 2017, security and defense funds exceeded spending on health and education for the first time in Honduran history.

The Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH, by its Spanish acronym) was launched in 2016 by the Organization of American States (OAS), at the request of the Honduran government. Its mandate came to an end in January 2020 due to a lack of support from the Honduran government.

During the period under review, the Mission promoted various legislative reforms and public policy initiatives to help strengthen anti-corruption efforts. While some of these reforms were considered and approved, by the end of the Mission’s mandate, most of these reforms and initiatives were pending approval. In general, the Mission collaborated with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Judiciary and other institutions. However, the National Congress constituted one of the main obstacles to the Mission’s work— refusing to debate the bills proposed by MACCIH or adopting measures to disrupt its work. The Congress also carried out election processes for key positions based on political agreements and not technical criteria.

Among MACCIH’s most important advances was the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Jurisdiction, comprised of a system of special courts and a special prosecutor’s office, known as the Special Prosecutor’s Unit against Impunity and Corruption (UFECIC).

The selection and certification process of the officials who comprise the Anti-Corruption Jurisdiction and the UFECIC provided a more objective, clear and transparent process and should be considered as a model for the selection of other key positions.

Corruption scandals significantly affect how much citizens say they trust democracy, the government, and political parties. The annual Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International offers a snapshot of citizen perceptions of corruption in Honduras. The Transparency International score ranges from 0 (least transparent) to 100 (most transparent), and is based in part on surveys with experts and companies regarding how corruption is perceived in the public sector. As the table shows, from 2015 to 2017, the perception index dropped one point annually, reflecting a high perception of corruption. By 2017, Honduras was among the 124 countries that scored below 50, and ranked as third most corrupt among Central American countries, above Nicaragua and Guatemala.

In 2014, the National Congress began developing a new Criminal Code to replace the 1983 version, which is considered to be out of date. Approved by legislators in early 2018, the new code is set to become effective in 2020. The new law reduces penalties for a number of corruption-related offenses, including embezzlement, influence peddling, obstruction of justice, and bribery. The law is also retroactive and would benefit those already convicted or facing prosecution.  Moreover, the new code does not regulate the practice of nepotism or illicit financing, although it does sanction the use of privileged information for the first time.

Over a four-year period (2014-2017), the Public Prosecutor’s Office received 7,433 complaints, a 43 percent increase in complaints regarding possible cases of corruption. The data provided by the Public Prosecutor’s Office shows that an estimated 12 percent of complaints received between 2014 and 2017 were investigated. In about 223 of these cases, the Public Prosecutor’s filed charges (90 cases in 2016; 70 in 2015; and 63 in 2014). Of these, 69 went to the trial stage. The table below shows a more detailed breakdown. From 2014 to 2017, the Judiciary accepted 534 cases related to possible corruption offenses. Of these, 23.7 percent resulted in convictions.    

The government’s main corruption oversight body is the Superior Court of Accounts. Created in 2002, its function is to control the use of public funds, assets and resources. This body includes a department tasked with monitoring compliance with public asset laws and reviewing the records of public officials to determine wrong-doing. However, the institution is in a vulnerable situation, as large corruption scandals were made public between 2014 and 2017. As of 2017, there were about 25 investigations handled by the Court on the verge of shutting down, as they’d been opened a decade ago and were nearing the statute of limitations deadline.   Moreover, in 2018, the Congress amended the Budget Law making the TSC the only institution capable of auditing public funds. The law also prohibits the Public Prosecutor from investigating cases of corruption within the legislative branch until after the TSC completes an audit, which normally take up to three years.  Another key corruption oversight body in Honduras is the National Anti-Corruption Council (CNA by its Spanish acronym), a civil society group established by legislative decree in 2005. It cannot initiate criminal proceedings, but it can share research findings with the Attorney General’s Office and attend trials. Of the 88 investigations presented by the CNA since its creation, only 15 have resulted in prosecutions. As the accompanying table shows, the CNA has recommended that prosecutions be opened into corruption cases involving the embezzlement of hundreds of millions of lempiras. 

In recent decades, Honduras has made legal advances to help prevent, detect, and punish violence and organized crime. Some important mechanisms were approved to combat organized crime, such as wiretapping, controlled deliveries, and use of undercover agents. However, the refusal to approve the Law on Effective Collaboration or interest in strengthening the witness protection program contradicts these advances. In general, regulations passed since 2010 are reactive and militaristic in nature, concentrating power in the executive branch at the expense of legislative and judicial branches. In addition to these measures reflecting the prioritization of security and defense, rather than the justice sector, they have been accompanied by legislation that restricts access to public information.

For example, despite the existence of a Law to Control Firearms, Explosives, and Similar Items, its restrictions are relaxed when it comes to carrying weapons and granting licenses. This regulation is in place despite the fact that 77 percent of homicides are committed with a firearm.

The Public Prosecutor’s Office has various entities for investigating possible offenses involving violence and organized crime. It has two directorates, a technical agency for investigation, four special prosecutors’ offices, and six specialized units to investigate homicides, femicides, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, illicit trafficking, asset laundering, and criminal conspiracy, among other crimes. However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office allocated $40.9 million, or 18.9 percent of its total budget, to these entities. As demonstrated in the table, the majority of funds were allocated to the Technical Agency of Criminal Investigation (ATIC for its title in Spanish), followed by the National Directorate for the Fight against Drug Trafficking. The Special Prosecutor’s Office for Women (FEM) received 8.3% of the funds and the witness protection program only received 2%. The budget of the FEM contrasts with its demand on human resources, having received 69,000 complaints in the period under study. By the end of 2017, these directorates, prosecutors’ offices and units accounted for 536 total staff, or 14 percent of total staff of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The ATIC had the largest number of personnel, followed by the Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Life and the Prosecutor’s Office dedicated to investigating organized crime. The judicial branch has created specialized bodies for fighting violence and organized crime, including Jurisdictional Bodies with National Territorial Competence, a Criminal Court of First Instance and a Criminal Appeals Court with National Jurisdiction on Extortion Matters and two Special Anti-Domestic Violence Courts.

Based on the information provided by the Public Prosecutor’s Office regarding crimes against life between 2014 and 2017, the Prosecutor’s Office received 20,053 complaints of homicide, 1,042 of murder, 51 of parricide, and 123 of femicide. In that four-year period, the Public Prosecutor’s Office filed charges in 303 cases for the offense of homicide, 711 for murder, 44 for parricide, and 47 for femicide. For crimes related to organized criminal activity, the Public Prosecutor’s Office received 6,488 formal complaints between 2014 and 2017. Of these, 42.7% (2,775) were for drug trafficking (including small-scale street dealing), 31.2% (2,024) for extortion, 7.8% (505) for illicit trafficking, 4.6% (229) for human trafficking, 4.5% for illegal manufacture and trafficking of weapons, 3.5% (229) for asset laundering, and less than 3% for kidnapping and unlawful association. In that period, the Public Prosecutor’s Office filed 1,244 criminal charges for extortion, 85 for kidnapping, 30 for human trafficking (between 2016 and 2017), 37 for money laundering (between 2014, 2015, and 2016), and 52 for the illegal manufacture and trafficking of weapons. No data was available on charges filed for crimes of drug trafficking or illicit trafficking. Between 2014 and 2017, the Public Prosecutor’s Office received 76,992 formal complaints for alleged crimes committed against women. Of all the complaints, 38.1% regarded domestic violence, 16.9% physical violence, 16.2% intrafamily violence and 6.2% sexual assault. It’s important to note that the Public’s Prosecutor’s Office did not provide data on criminal charges it filed for these offenses.

Since its creation in 1998, elements of military doctrine have persisted in the nature, formation, and operations of the Honduran National Police (PNH). Reform efforts have emphasized the need to strengthen the institution’s status as a civilian force. However, the executive branch has pushed to re-militarize public security, indicative of how militarized security policy continues to hold force in Honduran politics.

The PNH faces a crisis of legitimacy and citizen trust. In addition to the accusations leveled against the institution, its repressive manner of handling social conflicts led 72%of survey respondents to distrust the PNH and 53.0% to say they were afraid of it in a 2014 survey. In 2016, 58.6% of survey respondents said they distrusted the police. Of all the institutions in the country’s security and justice sector, only the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Judiciary, the Office of the President, and the National Congress have a lower confidence rating than the PNH.

In 2017, the government approved a new Organic Law of the National Police and Police Career Law. While they do have limitations, these new laws lay the foundations for modernizing the institution’s structure and developing a training, career and merit-based promotion system.

While there has been growth in the size of the police force, the Honduran National Police remains well below minimum international standards recommended for national coverage. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recommends countries have a minimum average of 300 police officers per 100,000 people. In 2014, the average number of police officers per 100,000 people in Honduras was 149; 141 in 2015; 157 in 2016; and 169 in 2017. With regard to the UNODC minimum, the PNH fell 14,604 officers short of this recommendation in 2017. The police force has gradually gained a greater proportion of women, reaching 20% of all personnel. During the period covered by this report, 24% of new members of the police were women. They also made up 10% of the graduates from the Honduras National Police University (UNPH). Between 2014 and 2017, the country witnessed a notable process of “privatization” of public safety responsibilities. In 2017, there were 7 private security agents for every 1 police officer. There has been a rapid increase in private security companies: in 2013, approximately 700 companies were registered, a number which swelled to 1,038 in 2017. This trend demonstrates gaps in public safety efforts as the National Police fills other functions, as well as the economic profitability that the private sector finds in the public security sector.

Since 2000, there have been various attempts to reform the National Police and address the problems of abuse and corruption within the institution. In 2012, the government created the Commission for Public Security Reform (CRSP), made up of national and international representatives tasked with proposing comprehensive reforms to security and justice institutions. After presenting various reforms, which failed to advance due to lack of congressional support, the CRSP ceased operating in 2014. As part of this effort, the government created the Directorate for Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career (DIECP). However, the DIECP faced criticism for failure to deliver results, and the government dissolved the agency in 2015. From 2012 to 2015, the DIECP had evaluated 8,546 police and removed only 227, all of whom were low-ranking individuals. In 2016, the government formed a Special Commission to Purge and Transform the Honduran National Police. By April 2018, it had removed 4,365 police officers.

The Ministry of Security received 2.5% of the overall national budget over the four years covered by this report. Its funding increased by 57.5% from 2014 to 2017. However, the trend changed in 2014 with the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (Policía Militar del Orden Público, PMOP), indicative of how the Ministry of Defense became the top priority in public security funding. Of the Ministry of Security's budget, 35.8% was allocated to preventive police services, 30.6% to activities common to all the different police services, 24.7% to investigatory services, 5.3% to traffic policing, and 3.6% to police training. However, in 2017 the funds allocated for investigating crime increased by 283% and for education by 261.5%. Meanwhile, funding for preventive services dropped by 72.6% and traffic policing by 70.5%.

Between 2014 and 2017, the role of the armed forces continued a pattern of expanding its mandate to include public security functions, a role that normally falls to civilian police. A clear example of this was the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) in 2013, composed of the armed forces and which sought to deploy to neighborhoods and public spaces under the control of organized criminal networks. By August 2017, the PMOP had 3,300 soldiers assigned to seven battalions. By the end of 2017, the PMOP had four times as many forces than the number of police officers dedicated to criminal investigation.

Between 2014 and 2017, the Ministry of Defense received a budget of around $959.3 million (L23,748,938,410), which increased annually. Part of these funds were used to finance the role of the military in public security functions. Of all the funds directed towards the security and justice sectors during the period under study, 42.9% of the budget was allocated to the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense increased all four years, from some $182 million (L4.5 billion) in 2014 to $279.9 million (L7 billion) in 2017, equivalent to a 55.6% increase. When comparing the budget of the Public Prosecutor’s Office with that of the Ministry of Defense, for every Lempira received by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the armed forces received 4.39 Lempiras. The budget for the Ministry of Defense represents 41% of funds collected through the so-called “security tax” under the Population Security Law. In 2014 and 2015, the military was the biggest beneficiary of the security tax. In 2016 and 2017, a larger percentage went to the police. Part of these funds financed the creation and continuation of the PMOP.

Between 2014 and 2017, Honduras experienced an increase in the number of complaints related to the excessive use of force by the Armed Forces. In 2015, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) stated that one of Honduras’ most severe human rights problems lay in its situation of violence and widespread insecurity, part of which stemmed from the PNH, the PMOP, and the Armed Forces “through their illegitimate use of force, in some cases in complicity with organized crime. Between 2012 and 2014, there were official complaints lodged in relation to at least nine murders (five in 2014 alone), more than 20 cases of torture, and roughly 30 detentions that were either illegal or involved the abusive use of force by military officials.

According to the National Human Rights Commission, members of the PMOP and the Armed Forces have been denounced for committing abuses of authority, illegal detentions, homicide, kidnapping, torture, rape, raids, and extrajudicial killings. In addition, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) cited conflict and violence that occurred around the general elections in November 2017, reporting that at least 23 people died in the post-election protests. According to reports, most injuries were inflicted by the military police or the Armed Forces. In addition, in 2016, they were denounced over the participation of active and retired military officials in the murder of human rights defender Berta Cáceres.

Despite the accusations against them, the Armed Forces’ participation in public security activities has some public support. Some public opinion polls taken between 2014 and 2016 indicate that units like the PMOP and the FUSINA are some of the security and justice institutions with the highest levels of citizen trust.

Numerous international and national human rights bodies call attention to the serious human rights situation in Honduras. Despite the high levels of violence and abuse against human rights defenders, there is a lack of official data on the attacks and threats against them. Data collected by the Monitor from multiple primary and secondary sources indicate that 141 defenders were killed in Honduras between 2014 and 2017. Murder attempts were made against another 13 in the same period. Among those killed, 10 had been granted protective measures by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The creation of a specialized prosecutor's office to deal with cases of crimes against human rights and defenders was an important step. However, the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights (FEDDHH) has limited jurisdiction and lacks specialized human rights protocols as well as the necessary human and financial resources. By the end of 2017, for example, the Prosecutor's Office had 18 prosecutors.

The Law for Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, Social Communicators, and Justice Officials, and its supporting regulations were an important step forward. However, staffing and resources at these institutions are low, limiting their effectiveness. For example, the units responsible for receiving cases and conducting risk analyses have 10 staff members for the entire country. This greatly limits the mechanism's ability to respond to urgent or emergency cases. By the end of 2017, the mechanism had received 230 requests, admitting 165 cases and rejecting 65. More than 71 percent of beneficiaries are human rights defenders, followed by journalists and communicators. Alarmingly, the system tends to rely on police escorts, temporary relocation, and technological measures (cameras, gates, panic buttons, etc). During the period analyzed, there was no record of psycho-social support nor preventative measures aimed at reducing risk factors and improving the prosecution of those responsible for threats.

A major concern in Honduras is the wrongful use of criminal law by judicial officials to criminalize defenders. Worryingly, it was difficult to access quantitative data on cases of criminalization during the period analyzed. As occurs in other countries, Honduran officials apply criminal offenses that don’t always respect legal principles or international standards. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, through the Common Crime Prosecutor’s Office, perpetuates the criminalization of human rights defenders. There are multiple cases in which defenders have been charged with land usurpation, threats, sedition, robbery, arson, unlawful association, and even homicide and murder; hampering their work and increasing the risks they face. The Honduran Attorney General’s Office does not maintain data regarding the number of complaints about threats delivered through online hate and defamation campaigns. However, international human rights organizations have observed the wide use of social media to perpetrate online hate campaigns against rights defenders in Honduras. Human rights defenders say they most frequently receive threats through anonymous phone calls, voice or text messages on platforms like WhatsApp, and defamatory Facebook pages populated by fake accounts.

In 2006, Honduras approved the Transparency and Public Information Access Law (LTAIP), which regulates the right to information and creates an independent institute, known as the IAIP, to facilitate citizens' access to public information and oversee the procedures required by the law. However, without considering IAIP guidelines, the Honduran government has enacted counter-reforms that increase secrecy and make it harder for the public to access information. These laws make it particularly difficult to access information related to defense and security issues (including the National Police and Armed Forces). The counter-reforms have also affected the investigation of cases of corruption and human rights violations, and limited civic oversight efforts. These laws include:

•  The Law on the Classification of Public Documents Related to National Security and Defense, also known as the "Law on Secrets” (approved in 2014). Aspects of the law infringe on the provisions of the Public Information Access Law by granting the National Defense and Security Council (CNDS) power to classify documents related to security and national defense, introducing new categories of confidential information, and extending the period of secrecy, among other provisions.  
• The National Intelligence Law, approved in 2013, establishes that the National Directorate of Investigation and Intelligence “will operate as a decentralized entity of the CNDS and will enjoy functional, administrative and budgetary independence; for which the Secretary of State in the Finance Office, will make the corresponding budgetary provisions according to article 10 of the Special Law of the National Council of Defense and Security.” The National Directorate can collect personal information, but it is confidential and not accountable to any civilian body.
• The Population Security Law (approved in 2011 and reformed in 2013). The law levies a tax to generate funds to prevent and combat crime, but there is little transparency around how these funds are being collected and spent. The Monitor found that any purchases made using these funds are not publicly available online. In one case, funds collected under this law were used to purchase a luxury presidential jet. 

The graphic below explains what types of information government agencies are required to publish online under the Honduran Transparency and Public Information Access Law (LTAIP). The transparency portals of the defense, security and justice sector institutions in general are limited in their ability to search for information, access statistics and submit information requests. They also show deficiencies in navigating between each other and being directed to the central portal. However, in accordance with Monthly Verification Reports and based on the data contained in the government's Single Transparency Portal, the IAIP has given the Secretary of Security, Secretary of Defense, and the Judiciary a rating of 100% compliance. Meanwhile, in 2017, the Public Prosecutor's Office received an 85% compliance rating.

By law, public officials are required to present an annual declaration of their income and assets to the Superior Court of Accounts, the entity responsible for overseeing the use of funds, assets, and resources administered by institutions handling state resources. However, there is a ban on making this information public, which is a major obstacle to improving transparency and accountability, and is incompatible with the Court’s accountability function, allowing it to detect possible cases of illicit enrichment.  Another problem is that the Superior Court of Accounts doesn’t have an effective way of verifying the asset declarations it receives from public officials. The body will only move to do so if a formal complaint is filed about the veracity of a public official’s declaration.