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THE HONDURAN NATIONAL POLICE

Evaluating the Professionalization of the Civilian
Police Force

AUGUST 2020 | SERIES 1



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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the problem of insecurity and impunity has deeply affected the people of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, making this region (known as the Northern Triangle of Central America) one of the most violent in the world. High levels of violence, corruption, and impunity have eroded the capacity of the states to develop accessible and efficient institutions, and address the needs of their populations.

The absence of effective responses has weakened citizens' confidence in state institutions, leading to an alarming number of people who have been internally displaced or forced to migrate to other countries to escape the violence and lack of economic opportunities.

Against this backdrop, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the University Institute on Democracy, Peace and Security (IUDPAS) of Honduras, the University Institute for Public Opinion (Iudop) of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador, and the Myrna Mack Foundation (FMM) of Guatemala have developed a tool for monitoring and evaluating the policies and strategies currently being implemented in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to reduce insecurity and violence, strengthen the rule of law, improve transparency and accountability, protect human rights, and fight corruption. This initiative has been made possible thanks to the support of the Latin America Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Tinker Foundation, the Seattle International Foundation (SIF), and the Moriah Fund.

THE CENTRAL AMERICA MONITOR

The Central America Monitor is based on the premise that accurate, objective, and complete data and information are necessary to reduce the high levels of violence and insecurity, and establish rule of law and governance in a democratic state. This will allow efforts to move beyond abstract discussions of reform to specific measures of change.

The Monitor is based on a series of more than 100 quantitative and qualitative indicators that allow a more profound level of analysis of the successes or setbacks made in eight key areas in each of the three countries.¹ More than a comprehensive list, the indicators seek to identify a way to examine and assess the level of progress of the three countries in strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions. The indicators seek to identify the main challenges in each of the selected areas and examine how institutions are (or are not) being strengthened over time. The Monitor uses information from different sources, including official documents and statistics, surveys, interviews, information from emblematic cases, and analysis of existing laws and regulations.

The indicators were developed over several months in a process that included an extensive review of international standards and consultation with experts. The eight areas analyzed by the Monitor include:

1. Strengthening the capacity of the justice system;
2. Cooperation with anti-impunity commissions;

3. Combatting corruption;
4. Tackling violence and organized crime;
- 5. Strengthening civilian police forces;**
6. Limiting the role of the armed forces in public security activities;
7. Protecting human rights;
8. Improving transparency.

The Monitor reports are published by area and by country. The first series of reports will serve as the baseline for subsequent analysis, which will be updated annually. Each annual series of reports will be analyzed in comparison with reports from the previous year. This allows researchers, civil society organizations, and other actors to assess the level of progress in strengthening the rule of law and reducing insecurity.

The first round of Monitor reports will primarily focus on data sets from an approximate 4-year time period, 2014 to 2017, in order to provide a snapshot of Central America's institutions.

The Monitor will serve as a tool for searchable, easy-to-comprehend data, delineating trends, progress, patterns, and gaps within and between the three countries of the Northern Triangle. The data, graphics, charts, and reports will be available on the Monitor's website.

This report of the Central America Monitor aims to define a baseline for the indicators related to strengthening the national civilian police force in Honduras.

ABOUT THE RESEARCH FOR THIS REPORT

Researchers gathered research through formal requests for information submitted to public information units in government agencies analyzed in this report. Research was also

collected by consulting reports published by domestic and international organizations that assess issues related to strengthening civilian police forces. Researchers also conducted some expert interviews for more in-depth and specific information on advances and challenges on these issues.

After compiling and reviewing information for each indicator, we developed a comprehensive baseline analysis on strengthening the Honduran National Police for the 2014-2017 time period. Each year, we will collect information on these same indicators to allow for comparative analysis over time. The main points of our research are synthesized in key findings in the following pages.

It is important to note that the Honduran National Police did not fully comply with requests for public information. Some of the information we requested was denied by the PNH, which stated that the information was "reserved," while some data was incomplete, factors which both affect our analysis of indicators.

For some information, the PNH stated that "it is not advisable to share certain variables, since they are confidential under Resolution No. SO-139-2018 of the Institute for Access to Public Information (*Instituto de Acceso de la Información Pública*)." Responding to another information request, authorities did not provide the data requested, with the explanation that "it would take time to compile it."

As indicated in this Monitor's report on transparency, the PNH has no information whatsoever published on the Single Transparency Portal (*Portal Único de Transparencia*) for information required regardless of whether it was requested. The legally required list for this institution of matters declared confidential and classified is not on the platform either.

KEY FINDINGS

- Since its creation in 1998, elements of military doctrine have persisted in the nature, formation, and operations of the Honduran National Police (*Policía Nacional de Honduras*, PNH). Reform efforts have emphasized the need to strengthen the institution's status as a civilian force. However, the executive branch has pushed to re-militarize public security, indicative of how militarized security policy continues to hold force in Honduran politics.
- From 2014 to 2017, the police force was constantly called into question for corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights violations. The scandals revealed a close tie between criminal activity, political networks, and police activity.
- The PNH faces a crisis of legitimacy and citizen trust. In addition to the accusations leveled against the institution, its repressive manner of handling social conflicts led 72% of survey respondents to distrust the PNH and 53.0% to say they were afraid of it in a 2014 survey. In 2016, 58.6% of survey respondents said they distrusted the police. Of all the institutions in the country's security and justice sector, only the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judiciary, the Office of the President, and the National Congress have a lower confidence rating than the PNH.
- The PNH's crisis has given rise to different reform processes to "clean up" the system. The most recent was in 2015, with the formation of the Special Commission to Purge and Transform the Honduran National Police (*Comisión Especial para la Depuración y Transformación de la Policía Nacional de Honduras*, CEDTPN). Although these recurring efforts have provided valuable recommendations and strategies, lack of political backing has led to limited, inconclusive, or at times fleeting results. While the Honduran government has allowed these reform efforts to move forward, it has also advanced initiatives that counteract the reforms.
- Alongside re-militarization of the police, public security has also been "privatized." In 2017, there were 7 private security agents for every 1 police officer. There has been a rapid increase in private security companies: in 2013, approximately 700 companies were registered, a number which swelled to 1,038 in 2017.
- The police's human resources fall well below the minimum required to provide at least basic territorial coverage. Although the police force grew by 19% over the period covered by this report, the average number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants was 149 in 2014, 141 in 2015, 157 in 2016, and 169 in 2017. These ratios are below the average of 300 officers recommended by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The PNH fell 14,604 officers short of this recommendation in 2017.
- The police force has gradually gained a greater proportion of women, reaching 20% of all personnel. During the period covered by this report, 24% of new members of the police were women. They also made up 10% of the graduates from the Honduras National Police University (*Universidad Nacional de la Policía de Honduras*, UNPH).

- Although the new Police Career Law, passed in 2017, changed some criteria for selecting and inducting police officers, the police force has lacked sufficiently strong screening and evaluation processes needed to prevent infiltration by organized crime. While the Honduran government expanded the requirements needed to join the police, there are still weaknesses in how aspiring officers are selected and trained. Between 2014 and 2017, 6,840 new members graduated from the Technical Police Institute (*Instituto Técnico Policial*, ITP).
- Training programs were out of date and lacked effective teaching strategies, while training centers reported infrastructure problems. Reform commissions have recommended a new model for the police education system. This recommendation garnered support from international development and cooperation agencies, which channeled millions to help bring programs up to date and improve infrastructure in the training centers.
- Historically, the PNH has struggled to investigate offenses or crimes committed by its members. The National Directorate for Internal Affairs (*Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Interiores*, DNAI) and the Police Career Investigation and Evaluation Directorate (*Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación de la Carrera Policial*, DIECP) failed to implement a permanent system for evaluations and dismissals. From 2012 to 2016, the DIECP evaluated 8,546 candidates and police officers, but it dismissed a mere 227 officers, all from the lower ranks.
- Within the time period covered by this report (2014–2017), the DIECP referred 17 cases of alleged unlawful enrichment by police officers to the Superior Court of Accounts (*Tribunal Superior de Cuentas*, TSC). However, the TSC ruled that the crimes could not be proven—in some cases, because the accused demonstrated that they were already wealthy before joining the police; in other cases, it was difficult to prove the alleged crime because of the amount of time that had passed. Four general directors of the PNH were dismissed (they were not removed by the DIECP) between 2012 and 2014 based on allegations of their involvement in illegal activities. None of them were brought to court.
- Starting in 2016, the Special Commission to Purge and Transform the Honduran National Police (CEDTPN) removed 4,365 police officers in slightly more than a year. In 2016, the CEDTPN dismissed 13.7% of the police force, and 16.7% in 2017. Over these two years, more people were purged from the police than joined it. Training centers came under pressure to expand the police force without properly screening or training candidates.
- Despite the results of its police purge, the CEDTPN has been called into question primarily because most of the officers who were dismissed were not brought to justice. However, in 2016 the CEDTPN delivered documentation to the Public Prosecutor’s Office on 455 members of the police suspected of participating in illegal activities. The investigations involve high-ranking officers and involve alleged drug trafficking, money laundering, unlawful enrichment, and other serious crimes. The Public Prosecutor’s Office asserts that no charges have yet been filed because the cases require lengthy investigations; the office has also said that the information provided by the CEDTPN is insufficient for pressing charges.

- In 2017, a new Organic Law and Police Career Law were passed, marking significant achievements for the CEDTPN, which worked alongside the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (*Misión de Apoyo Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad en Honduras*, MACCIH). The National Congress adopted many of its recommendations, including the creation of the Directorate of Police Disciplinary Affairs (*Dirección de Asuntos Disciplinarios Policiales*, DIDADPOL), which is charged with avoiding the mistakes of its predecessors (the DNAI and DIECP).
- The Ministry of Security received 2.5% of the overall national budget over the four years covered by this report. Its funding increased by 57.5% from 2014 to 2017. However, the trend changed in 2014 with the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (*Policía Militar del Orden Público*, PMOP), indicative of how the Ministry of Defense became the top priority in public security funding.
- Of the Ministry of Security's budget, 35.8% was allocated to preventive police services, 30.6% to activities common to all the different police services, 24.7% to investigatory services, 5.3% to traffic policing, and 3.6% to police training. However, in 2017 the funds allocated for investigating crime increased by 283% and for education by 261.5%. Meanwhile, funding for preventive services dropped by 72.6% and traffic policing by 70.5%.
- Over the last 30 years, one of the security initiatives most strongly supported by the international community is community policing, but it is also among those farthest from becoming a reality in Honduras. The re-militarization of public security (currently the dominant trend) is incompatible with a community policing philosophy. A PNH that is integrated into the community and regains trust, respects human rights, and has strong training in values has yet to be achieved.
- The Ministry of Security did not provide all of the information requested in order to prepare this report. It refused to provide basic information such as the number of members of the police. As indicated in this Monitor's report on transparency, the PNH has no information whatsoever published on the Single Transparency Portal (*Portal Único de Transparencia*) for information required regardless of whether it was requested.

THE HONDURAN NATIONAL POLICE

Evaluating the Professionalization of the Civilian Police Force

In the 1990s, Honduras entered an unprecedented phase of its development. For the first time, the country's economy opened and it dispensed with military rule, choosing to de-militarize the government and strengthen civilian institutions. Under these circumstances, a discussion arose about the need for separate approaches to "defense" and "security."

The police reforms' origins date back to 1993 when police investigations were made independent from the Armed Forces through the closure of the National Investigation Directorate (*Dirección Nacional de Investigación*, DNI), which was considered the repressive arm of the Public Security Force (*Fuerza de Seguridad Pública*, FUSEP). The Public Prosecutor's Office was created in 1994, followed by the National Human Rights Commission (*Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos*, CONADEH) in 1995 and the Ministry of Security (*Ministerio de Seguridad*) in 1998.

However, it was the 1996 amendment of Article 293 of the Constitution of the Republic (which had been in force since 1982) that set out the theoretical underpinnings of the PNH as an apolitical and purely civilian institution that respects human rights.²

The police, which since 1963 had constituted the fourth force of the military structure, no longer met the demands of the new circumstances and another institution needed to be created. Therefore, in 1998 the National Honduran Police was created, operating separate from the armed forces.

The Organic Law of the PNH, which was passed in 1998, created the National Domestic Security Council (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Interior*, CONASIN), and the new police force replaced the FUSEP, a military entity created in 1976 and questioned for its involvement in corruption, crime, and human rights abuses during the 1980s.³

However, the process of overhauling the traditional approach to policing was hobbled by enduring roots in the FUSEP, the structure of which was practically transplanted to the PNH.⁴ This meant the civilian police was encumbered by military doctrine since its inception.

Paradoxically, the creation of the PNC was a setback for the process of professionalization and civilian oversight in criminal investigations, as it absorbed the Criminal Investigation Department (*Departamento de Investigación Criminal*, DIC), which starting in 1995 and had made important progress under the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The PNH's evolution coincided with a sharp rise in violence and insecurity in Honduras. In just seven years, Honduras went from an average of 37 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 to 85.5 in 2012, the highest homicide rate in the world (outside of war zones).⁵

In this context of insecurity, the police have been constantly called into question for corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights violations. Numerous scandals have revealed close ties between criminal activity, political networks, and police activity.

In addition to the accusations leveled against it, the repressive way it has handled social conflicts (especially after the coup in 2009 and post-election conflict in 2017) further eroded its legitimacy and citizens' trust. In 2014, just 5.2% of the population had "high confidence" in the institution,⁶ while 53% reported they were afraid of it.⁷

The PNH's crisis has given rise to different reform processes to "clean up" its system. Although these reoccurring efforts have yielded valuable recommendations and strategies, lack of political backing has led to limited, inconclusive, or potentially fleeting results. The State has allowed for the formation of reform committees, but subsequent support for these initiatives mainly comes from civil society and international development and cooperation agencies.

The reform processes also coincide with other counter-reform processes. Civilian proposals like creating a community police force have been undermined by policies that re-militarize security. Putting the armed forces back on the streets jeopardizes the process started in the 1990s of ensuring civilian oversight of government and security forces.

In addition to being re-militarized, public security has also been "privatized." Private security agencies have been made profitable by the police crisis. In 2013, approximately 700 companies of this type were registered, a figure

which swelled to 1038 in 2017. In 2015, the ratio of private security agents to police officers was 7 to 1, which highlights the PNH's weakness and the policing gaps it failed to fill.⁸

Organization and General Structure of the PNH

Since 1998, the Honduran President has topped the chain of command, followed by the Minister of Security, who outranks the Director General of the PNH (the first director was not appointed until 2008).

The PNH serves and has a presence in all 18 departments of Honduras. It has 18 departmental offices, two metropolitan offices (Central District and San Pedro Sula) and 14 metropolitan units.

Since its formation, three organic laws for the PNH have been passed (in 1998, 2008, and 2017). Each version modified the PNH's organization and structure. Internally, the Office of the Director General tops the hierarchy. This office consists of a Director General and Assistant Director General, both appointed by the president of Honduras for a three-year term.

Under the Police Career Law, the institution has the following police categories and ranks in descending order: general officer, superior officer, subordinate officer, noncommissioned officer, and agent.⁹

FIGURE 1

HIERARCHY BY POLICE CATEGORY AND RANK, 2017-2020




Source: Based on the Police Career Law

The most recent structure, recommended in 2016 by the CEDTPN, established four departments under the authority of the Office of the Director General: Preventive Community Policing Services, Criminal Investigation Services, Highway and Traffic Police Services, and Police Training Services.

The PNH's current organizational structure also has five levels: executive, advisory, oversight, assistance, and operational.

FIGURE 2

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FOR THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF THE PNH, 2016-2020



Source: Based on Executive Decree PCM 075-2016

At the executive level is the Strategic Board, which oversees five divisions: planning, operational procedures, and continuous improvement; police intelligence; human resources; logistics; and the Directorate for Interagency and Community Affairs.

At the oversight level are the Inspectorate General and the Internal Control Unit. The

assistance level consists of the Telematics Department and the Administration and Finance Department. Meanwhile, the advisory level is made up of the Executive Division and the Legal Division.

Each operational department is composed of directorates, which have been modified via three organic laws (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE PNH UNDER DIFFERENT ORGANIC LAWS, 1998-2017

No.	Organic Law 1998	Organic Law 2008	Organic Law 2017
1	General Directorate for Criminal Investigation (<i>Dirección General de Investigación Criminal, DGIC</i>)	National Directorate for Criminal Investigation (<i>Dirección Nacional de Investigación Criminal, DNIC</i>)	Police Investigations Department (<i>Dirección Policial de Investigaciones, DPI</i>)
2	Special Directorate for Special Investigatory Services (<i>Dirección Especial de Servicios Especiales de Investigación, DESEI</i>)	National Directorate for Special Investigatory Services (<i>Dirección Nacional de Servicios Especiales de Investigación, DNSEI</i>)	National Directorate for Special Forces (<i>Dirección Nacional de Fuerzas Especiales, DNFE</i>)
3	General Directorate for Preventive Policing (<i>Dirección General de Policía Preventiva, DGPP</i>)	National Directorate for Preventive Policing (<i>Dirección Nacional de Policía Preventiva, DNPP</i>)	National Directorate for Prevention and Community Security (<i>Dirección Nacional de Prevención y Seguridad Comunitaria, DNPSC</i>)
4	General Directorate for Special Preventive Services (<i>Dirección General de Servicios Especiales Preventivos, DGSEP</i>)	National Directorate for Special Preventive Services (<i>Dirección Nacional de Servicios Especiales Preventivos, DNSEP</i>)	National Directorate for Protection and Special Services (<i>Dirección Nacional de Protección y Servicios Especiales, DNPSE</i>)
5	General Directorate for Police Education (<i>Dirección General de Educación Policial, DGEP</i>)		National Directorate for Police Education (<i>Dirección Nacional de Educación Policial, DNEP</i>)
6		National Directorate of Internal Affairs (<i>Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Internos, DNAI</i>)	
7		National Directorate of Traffic (<i>Dirección Nacional de Tránsito, DNT</i>)	National Directorate for Roads and Transportation (<i>Dirección Nacional de Vialidad y Transporte, DNVT</i>)

8			National Directorate for Border Police Services (<i>Dirección Nacional de Servicios Policiales Fronterizos, DNSPF</i>)
9			National Directorate for Anti-Drug Policing (<i>Dirección Nacional Policial Antidrogas, DNPA</i>)

Source: Prepared based on the organic laws of the PNH

The National Directorate for Prevention and Community Security is the body in charge of preventing, deterring, and controlling crimes. Its responsibility is to guarantee citizen security and people’s rights and liberties, as well as to maintain law and order and social harmony through a community-oriented approach that respects human rights.

The Police Investigations Department operates under the legal and technical authority of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. It is in charge of investigating whether or not a crime occurred and of identifying victims and suspects in order to furnish evidence for criminal proceedings.

This directorate has undergone the most changes in name and position within the security system. It initially operated as the DNI within the FUSEP. Starting in 1995, it operated as the DIC under the Public Prosecutor’s Office, until in 1998 became part of the General Directorate for Criminal Investigation (DGIC). In 2008, it was renamed the National Directorate for Criminal Investigation (DNIC) until finally becoming the DPI in 2015.

The National Directorate for Roads and Transportation (DNVT) directs, organizes, and

implements transportation and highway security policies. It works in collaboration with the National Land Transportation Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Transporte Terrestre, INTT*).

The National Directorate for Special Forces (DNFE) oversees the actions of special groups to preserve and reestablish law and order in exceptional situations. It is made up of the Special Response Team and Intelligence Troop (*Unidad de Toma Integral Gubernamental de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad, TIGRES*), the Special Operations Command (*Comando de Operaciones Especiales, COBRA*), the Anti-Riot Unit (*Unidad Antimotines*), and the Aerial Police Unit (*Unidad Aero Policial*).

The National Directorate for Protection and Special Services (DNPSE) is charged with protecting dignitaries, officials, and former officials at special risk, and diplomatic facilities, as well as defenders of the environment, human rights, and cultural heritage. It is also responsible for guaranteeing the precautionary and security measures ordered by other relevant authorities, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Special Protection Unit for Human Rights Defenders (*Unidad Especial de Protección de Defensores de Derechos Humanos*) is part of

this directorate.

The National Directorate for Anti-Drug Policing (DNPA) is in charge of preventing and investigating drug-related crimes, working under the legal and technical authority of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in order to furnish evidence.

The National Directorate for Border Police Services (DNSPF) is responsible for protecting customs facilities, ports, airports, and border checkpoints, implementing mechanisms to control drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, and money laundering.

The National Directorate for Police Education (DNEP) directs and evaluates police training at

all levels. This directorate is part of the Police Education System (*Sistema de Educación Policial*, SEP).

Human Resources

Based on data provided by the PNH (and supplemented with CEDTPN reports), the police force (including all ranks of officers and support staff) grew by 19% between 2014 and 2017, from 12,583 members to 14,950. The Ministry of Security declined to provide information disaggregated by gender, but women are estimated to make up 20% of the police force. This percentage is triple that of the previous decade, and it continues to gradually rise.¹⁰

TABLE 2

PNH PERSONNEL, INCLUDING NUMBER OF POLICE, OFFICERS, AND ASSISTANTS, 2014-2017

2014	2015	2016	2017
12,583	12,091	13,657	14,950

Source: Prepared based on data from the PNH and CEDTPN

In 2014, Honduras had an average of 149 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants. This ratio was 141 in 2015, 157 in 2016, and 169 in 2017, all well below the minimum ratio of 300 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants recommended by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).¹¹

To meet the UNODC recommendation, the PNH would have required a police force numbering 29,554 in 2017. In other words, the police force was 14,604 members short of that standard in 2017. According to the Ministry of Security, the goal is to meet that recommendation by 2024.¹²

This data shows that the police's human resources are well below the minimum required to provide at least basic territorial coverage. For that reason, the PNH has little to no presence in many urban and rural areas of Honduras.

In contrast, in 2017 there were approximately 79,000 private security guards, or 528% more than PNH personnel. That year, there were calculated to be 840 private guards per 100,000 Hondurans, greatly exceeding the ratio of 169 police officers and almost tripling the UNODC recommendation.¹³ The private security sector has experienced rapid growth, increasing from

700 companies in 2013 to 1,038 in 2017. There are also hundreds of unregistered businesses.¹⁴

For this report, no information was obtained regarding how many police officers there are in the different categories and ranks, as the request for this information was denied by the Ministry of Security, which claimed that “it is not advisable to share certain variables, since they are confidential under Resolution No. SO-139-2018 of the Institute for Access to Public Information (*Instituto de Acceso de la Información Pública*).”

TRAINING AND POLICE CAREER

The quality of the PNH depends on the human and material resources at its disposal for performing its functions and, to a large degree, on its recruiting, selection, and training policies. This is why the processes to reform the public security system insist on improving police education.

In Honduras, military doctrine guided the inception of police education. The National Police Academy (*Academia Nacional de Policía, ANAPO*) was created in 1976, the Police Training Center (*Centro de Instrucción Policial, CIP*) in 1982, and

the Police Officer Training School (*Escuela de Capacitación para Oficiales de Policía, ECOP*) in 1984, all as part of the FUSEP.


The first PNH Organic Law of 1998 established the General Directorate for Police Education (DGEP), responsible for the professionalization of police training at different educational levels. However, the creation of the civilian police did not mean military doctrine disappeared from police education.¹⁵

The second Organic Law (2008) established the Police Education System (SEP) and created the Honduran National Police University (UNPH). Becoming part of the Council of Higher Education (*Consejo de Educación Superior, CES*) marked a step forward for the professionalization of police training. The new organic law transformed the ECOP into the Higher Institute of Police Education (*Instituto Superior de Educación Policial, ISEP*) and the CIP into the Technical Police Institute (ITP).

In 2008, the PNH adopted a new hierarchical system. In descending order, the levels are: superior, executive, inspection, basic, cadet, and, lastly, assistance.

FIGURE 3

HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE WITHIN THE PNH, BY LEVEL, 2008-2020



Source: Prepared based on PNH Organic Laws of 2008 and 2017

The Organic Law of 2017 modified the system for recruiting, inducting, and training police. The DGEP became the DNEP, an entity in charge of the UNPH, ANAPO, ITP, and the recently created the Police Leadership Training Center (*Centro de Capacitación para Oficiales de Policía, CCOP*), the Training Center for Police Agents, Classes, and Noncommissioned Officers (*Centro de Capacitación para Policías, Clases y Suboficiales, CCPCS*), the School of Criminal Investigation (*Escuela de Investigación Criminal, EIC*) and the Center for Technical Police Specialties Schools (*Centro de Escuelas Técnicas de Especialidades Policiales, CETEP*).

The most recent Organic Law established that the entities in charge of running the PNH's educational programs are the UNPH, which offers undergraduate and graduate degrees; the ANAPO for training leaders; and the ITP for basic-level training. The latter two are the first filter for joining the police force.

Under the laws from 1998 and 2008, candidates to join the police are selected via entrance exams administered by the different police education centers. The evaluations covered psychophysical capacity, academic requirements, and personal background. After 2008, a socioeconomic assessment of candidates was included.

TABLE 3**REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING THE POLICE FORCE ACCORDING TO THE ORGANIC LAWS OF THE NATIONAL HONDURAN POLICE (PNH)**

No.	Organic Law 1998	Organic Law 2008	Organic Law 2017
1	Be Honduran by birth.	Be Honduran by birth.	Be Honduran by birth.
2	Be over age 18.	Be over age 18.	Be between ages 18 and 35.
3	Health status compatible with performing the duties of the position.	Health status compatible with performing the duties of the position.	Health status compatible with performing the duties of the position; men must be at least 1.65m tall and women 1.6m tall.
4	Have a primary level education at minimum.	Have a primary level education at minimum (candidates for criminal investigation agent must have finished lower secondary school).	Have completed upper secondary school at minimum.
5	No human rights violations.	No human rights violations.	Pass all trustworthiness evaluation tests: polygraph, toxicology, financial, psychological, and socioeconomic.
6	Have no criminal record or history of court proceedings.	Have no criminal record or history of court proceedings.	Have no criminal record or active court proceedings against them.
7	Not have been removed from public office as a disciplinary measure.	Not have been removed from public office as a disciplinary measure.	Not have been removed from public office or a private position as a disciplinary measure.
8			Not have been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces or National Police.

Source: Prepared based on PNH Organic Laws of 1998, 2008, and 2017

Despite the entrance requirements, the director of the ITP stated in 2012 that no filters were applied when selecting candidates, since recruiting was done by visiting specific locations or receiving people who wanted to sign up without any type of filter or process.¹⁶

As shown in Table 3, the system’s entrance requirements were expanded in 2013 (and later incorporated into the Organic Law of 2017) to require that candidates have finalized upper secondary school and to include an investigation into their finances, in addition to toxicological, polygraph, psychometric, and knowledge-based tests administered by the Preventive Trustworthiness Control Center (*Centro de Control de Confianza Preventivo*) in coordination with the DNEP and the Human Resources Directorate.

Researchers for this report requested information on the prior military experience of candidates who enrolled at training centers, but the official

response was that “information on prior military experience was not requested as an entrance requirement.” The government similarly did not provide information on candidates or members of the police force broken down according to the country’s different ethnic groups.

ITP students can graduate from a basic or technical program. The basic program lasts eight months, and the technical program one year. From 2014 to 2017, 8,982 candidates entered this institute; 23.3% of them were women. During the same time period, 6,840 members graduated, with an average of 23.7% women.

As can be seen in Table 4, the number of candidates and graduates increased significantly between 2014 and 2017.

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES WHO ENROLLED AND GRADUATED FROM THE TECHNICAL POLICE INSTITUTE (ITP), 2014-2017

Candidates/graduates	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Men enrolled	324	1,241	2,379	2,947	6,891
Women enrolled	77	351	749	914	2,091
Total	401	1,592	3,128	3,861	8,982
Men graduated	195	1,008	1,905	2,112	5,220
Women graduated	59	299	596	666	1,620
Total	254	1,307	2,501	2,778	6,840

Source: Prepared with data from the PNH

The UNPH offers three different 4-year undergraduate degrees (Police Administration, Police Sciences, and Criminal Investigation) and four masters degrees (Forensic Sciences,

Human Security, Public Policy, and Security and Forensic Management).

From 2014 to 2017, 1618 members entered

the UNPH's undergraduate programs, 9.4% of whom were women. During the same time

period, 379 sub-inspectors graduated, with an average of 10% women.

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF POLICE WHO ENROLLED AND GRADUATED FROM UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL POLICE UNIVERSITY OF HONDURAS, 2014-2017

Enrolled/ Graduated	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Men enrolled	393	342	344	387	1,466
Women enrolled	37	27	38	50	152
Total	430	369	382	437	1,618
Men graduated	123	102	0	116	341
Women graduated	22	7	0	9	38
Total	145	109	0	125	379

Source: Prepared with data from the PNH

During the period covered by this report, 1641 people enrolled in the UNPH graduate courses, 9.6% of whom were women. Meanwhile, 388

people graduated from masters programs, 10.3% of whom were women.

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES WHO ENROLLED AND GRADUATED FROM GRADUATE PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL POLICE UNIVERSITY OF HONDURAS, 2014-2017

Ingresos y egresos	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Men enrolled	393	393	329	368	1483
Women enrolled	37	65	23	33	158
Total	430	458	352	401	1,641
Men graduated	125	104	1	118	348
Women graduated	22	7	0	11	40
Total	147	111	1	129	388

Source: Prepared with data from the PNH

A 2012 study by the Organization of American States (OAS) on Honduras's national security system found two major problems with police training. First, the educational system lacked

the necessary controls for selecting candidates joining the police, which allows members of organized crime to infiltrate its ranks.¹⁷ Second, the training programs were out of date and

lacked good teaching strategies. Additionally, training centers had infrastructure problems.

The Commission for Public Security Reform (*Comisión de Reforma de la Seguridad Pública, CRSP*)—which was formed in 2012 after two young university students were killed by active-duty police officers—was deeply critical of the flawed police culture and recommended overhauling the entire police education system.

The CRSP found that the PNH had a “dearth of police doctrine and an excess of military doctrine” taught at its training centers. It also argued that the SEP was organized and functioned in a disjointed way that was disconnected from the needs of the police force and Honduran society. It therefore proposed restructuring the educational system in a way aligned with the goal of creating a community police force that is closer to citizens and protects human rights.¹⁸

The CRSP highlighted an urgent need to develop and strengthen the systems for attracting, inducting, retaining, promoting, and completing the training of police officers based on principles of efficiency and transparency, as well as on objective criteria such as merit, equity, and skill.

The commission proposed a draft Police Career Law to redistribute functions between the relevant bodies, specifying the rights and obligations of the police service. It also promoted the systematic application of controls for entering the police and for teachers, as well as the establishment of a code of conduct and the application of tools for reinforcing ethical behavior among police.

The CRSP’s proposal to reform the SEP and police careers received neither attention nor support from the State. While the Commission proposed a community police force, the state pushed for the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (2013). However, its

recommendations served as the basis for other reform processes.

Curricular and Police Career Reforms

With regards to the curriculum, the CRSP stated that the SEP did not give a precise definition of the profile for entering and graduating from its programs, making it difficult to specify the knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and abilities to be developed in the curriculum.

Building on the CRSP’s assessment and proposal, and with economic support from international cooperation entities (which invested 450 million lempiras, or \$18 million USD), the ITP launched an overhaul of its curriculum in 2014.¹⁹ Changes included stiffer recruiting requirements, reworked syllabuses, better-quality teachers, and improved infrastructure.

Starting in 2014, the ITP cut its course offering from 54 to 25 courses, which were grouped around eight central themes, including general education (4), human rights (3), training on police sciences (12), and specific training (5). This reduction was offset by an increase of 590 class hours.

The changes shifted the focus away from physical training and towards theory. A new educational program was also created, in which police instructors were required to have a professional degree (undergraduate level) and have no record of offenses. A group of civilian teachers were also brought on to teach non-police classes.²⁰

ITP graduates value these changes, but argue that the model is too academic and does not provide enough hands-on experience. Also, given the number of police officers that were purged, the ITP came under pressure to expand the police force without properly preparing candidates.²¹

Between 2014 and 2017, there were also plans to reform the ANAPO and the UNPH. For the UNPH, these reforms centered on the curriculum: updating the syllabuses and professionalizing the courses offered.²²

By the end of 2017, construction had begun on the School of Criminal Investigation (EIC) in the city of Comayagua. The school was built with support from the government of the United States through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and opened in 2008.

In 2017, the Honduran Congress passed the new Police Career Law, drafted in collaboration with the CEDTPN, which began its work in 2016. The new law replaced the Directorate for Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career (DIECP) with the Directorate of Police Disciplinary Affairs (DIDADPOL), establishing rules for sanctions for minor or major offenses, ranging from verbal warnings to dismissal.

The police career system was also strengthened through a system based on merit, performance, and behavior. Additionally, evaluation and trustworthiness processes—like toxicology tests, financial investigations, socioeconomic studies, polygraphs, and other tools—were also instituted.

The passage of the new Organic Law and Police Career Law in 2017 was another of the CEDTPN's achievements. To achieve this objective, the Commission worked alongside the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).

Although the National Congress rejected the proposal to grant police officers the status of Honduran government officials, it did accept other suggestions from the Mission and the CEDTPN, particularly those related to transparency in the PNH's management. The

new Organic Law also included the concept of community policing, stressing the importance of trust and the interactions the institution should have with the general public.

The need for explicitly recognizing police officers as government officials is not a mere formality. It is imperative to acknowledge the importance that a government official represents within society. They are responsible for complying with several duties and obligations, and their failure to do so, or their violation of that responsibility, can subject them to criminal, civil and administrative liability, as established by Honduran law.²³

DISCIPLINARY PROCESS AND INTERNAL OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

From 2008 to 2011, the National Directorate of Internal Affairs (DNAI) was responsible for investigating offenses or crimes by members of the police. However, its disciplinary system was rudimentary and disjointed, without permanent evaluation and purging procedures. Also, the head of the directorate answered to the PNH itself, stripping it of any autonomy.

Following the CRSP's recommendations, in 2011 the DNAI was replaced by the Directorate for Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career (DIECP), an entity that emerged as a result of calls from society to clean up the police force and make it more transparent.²⁴

Unlike the DNAI, the DIECP was set up as separate from the Ministry of Security, with—in theory—operational and administrative autonomy. The DIECP was staffed by 84 employees in 2014, 119 in 2015, 129 in 2016, and 119 in 2017. Over four years (2012-2016), the government invested 211 million lempiras (\$8.7 million) in its operation.

From 2012 to 2016, the directorate evaluated 8,546 candidates and police officers using toxicological, psychometric, and polygraph tests, as well as, to a lesser extent, socioeconomic assessments. However, the DIECP removed a mere 227 police officers, all from the lower

ranks. Over the first year and a half, it purged 188 members of the PNH, and over the other three and a half years, it only dismissed 39 police officers.²⁵

TABLE 7

POLICE EVALUATED BY THE DIRECTORATE FOR INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF THE POLICE CAREER (DIECP), 2012-2016

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Police Evaluated	1,307	2634	855	2,041	1,709	8,546

Source: Prepared based on data from the CEDTPN

The DIECP referred 17 cases of alleged unlawful enrichment by police leadership to the Superior Court of Accounts (TSC). However, the TSC claimed that the crimes could not be proven because the accused demonstrated that they were already millionaires before joining the police or it was difficult to prove the crime because of the amount of time that had passed.²⁶ The explanation that a candidate for entering the police force was a millionaire makes no sense and also indicates that the candidates' assets were not investigated when they joined the police.

In this context, from 2012 to 2014, four director generals of the PNH were removed from office (not purged by the DIECP) due to alleged involvement in illegal acts.²⁷ None of them were tried in court.

Essentially, after five years of work, the DIECP was criticized for its limited success at cleaning up the police force; it would let the PNH decide who would be subjected to tests of trustworthiness, targeting the lower ranks while skipping over the upper echelons.

The police crisis deepened in April 2016 when The New York Times published an investigation claiming that five former director generals and two dozen other police leaders of different ranks within the PNH aided in drug trafficking and participated in the murder of the head of the Directorate for the Fight against Drug Trafficking (*Dirección de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico, DLCN*), Julián Arístides González, as well as of security expert Alfredo Landaverde.²⁸

The scandal led the National Congress to pass an emergency decree to begin a new police purge process, creating the Special Commission to Purge and Transform the Honduran National Police (CEDTPN) in April of 2016. The Commission was assigned the following objectives: evaluate the suitability of police officers, establish a mechanism for overseeing members of the PNH, refer the files of all dismissed personnel to the Public Prosecutor's Office, hold dismissal hearings, and recommend structural reforms of the PNH.

BOX 1

GOALS PROPOSED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO PURGE AND TRANSFORM THE NATIONAL POLICE (CEDTPN) IN 2016

1. Amend the Organic Law and the Police Career Law.
2. Hire new police leadership.
3. Professionalize the PNH's senior leadership structures.
4. Create the Directorate of Police Disciplinary Affairs (DIDADPOL) to run checks on police personnel and investigate reports of police irregularities.
5. Disband the DIECP.
6. Internationally certify the curriculum previously incorporated into the ITP, then develop a similar curriculum for the officer training academy, ANAPO. All training would include a new police culture that emphasizes the idea of serving society and respecting human rights.
7. Retrain and certify patrol officers to instill principles.
8. Provide specialized training on criminal investigation.
9. Make being a police officer dignified by improving job conditions and properly equipping the police force.
10. Internationally certify all members of the police.
11. Create a civil society monitoring commission to oversee the implementation of a five-year plan.

The CEDTPN had four members: The Minister of Security (as director), a representative from civil society organizations, a representative from evangelical churches (the Catholic Church did not agree to participate), and a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia, CSJ). A group of three advisors was appointed for additional assistance.

In a few weeks, the Commission did what the DIECP failed to do and began investigating from the top down: starting with senior leadership of the PNH—removing six of the nine highest ranking officers, followed by 23 out of 47 active-

duty police commissioners.

Between April 2016 and the end of 2017, the CEDTPN removed 4,365 members of the police. It should be clarified that they were not all purged, as there were also those who left the police force to go into mandatory or voluntary retirement, or due to desertion and other reasons like death or dismissal. Of the total personnel that were removed or left the police, 63% (2,742) was due to the restructuring, 23% (1,009) to voluntary retirement, 6.8% (298) to desertion, and 7.2% for other reasons.²⁹

TABLE 8**POLICE PURGED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO PURGE AND TRANSFORM THE HONDURAN NATIONAL POLICE (CEDTPN), APRIL 2016-2017**

Year	Departures due to Restructuring	Retired Police	Desertion	Other motives	Total
2016	1,408	230	109	122	1,869
2017	1,334	779	189	194	2,496

Source: Prepared based on CEDTPN reports

Of the total number of officers who were no longer part of the police force, 8.7% were high-ranking officers (379), 4.8% were low-ranking members (209), and 86.4% were agents at the basic level (3,773). All told, the CEDTPN removed 13.7% of the police force in 2016 and 16.7% in 2017. Over these two years, more people were purged from the police than joined it.

Of the 4,365 officers no longer part of the police force, it is estimated that only 100 women were purged, or 2.3% of the total.³⁰

Despite its achievements, the CEDTPN has been called into question for three main reasons: for committing administrative injustice, for inefficiency, and for the lack of judicial follow-up for those who were purged.³¹

The administrative injustice criticism is that officers were dismissed without just cause, that purging denies people the right to due process, and that people were not informed of the reasons for their dismissal. The Commission’s justification is that in a large-scale “cleanup,” arguing each dismissal in court would have brought the purge to a halt.

Another criticism is that while the purge dismissed a significant number of alleged criminals, many still remain in the police. For example, members

of the new PNH leadership proposed by the Commission have been accused of involvement with drug trafficking.³²

The third criticism is that purged police officers were not brought to justice. However, in 2016 the CEDTPN sent documentation on 455 police officers suspected of having participated in illegal activities to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. This number amounts to 10.4% of the police officers removed from the PNH. The investigations involve high-ranking officers and center on drug trafficking, money laundering, unlawful enrichment, and other serious crimes. The Public Prosecutor’s Office claims that the lack of charges is due to the fact that the cases require long investigation times, and that the information provided by the CEDTPN is insufficient for pressing those criminal charges.³³

There have, however, been emblematic cases between 2014 and 2017, like the extradition of two former police officers and the handing over of at least six members of the police³⁴ to the United States for their alleged ties to drug trafficking; or the arrest in 2017 of a former PNH commissioner accused of performing transactions worth over 1.5 billion lempiras (\$60 million) and owning 1,000 vehicles.³⁵ This wealth is at odds with the salary of a police commissioner, which is approximately 56,000

lempiras (\$2,200) per month.³⁶

The DIDADPOL began operations in 2018 with the aim of running checks on personnel and investigating reports of offenses committed by police officers. With regard to sexual harassment within the PNH, DIDADPOL regulations classify the use of position or rank within the police to harass coworkers or subordinates or induce or establish relationships of a sexual nature with them as a serious offense. If proven, the consequence of this offense is dismissal of the police officer, with no liability for the state. From 2016 to 2017, the DIECP resolved 16 sexual harassment complaints.

BUDGET AND USE OF FUNDS

The State has taken various economic measures in relation to security and defense, ranging from increasing and modifying budgets to creating the “Population Security Tax” trust.³⁷ As a result, funding for these two sectors has increased considerably.

During the period covered by this report, the Ministry of Security received 20.3 billion lempiras (\$812 million). This amounts to 2.5% of the total national budget for these four years, which was 804 billion lempiras (\$32.4 billion).

TABLE 9

BUDGET FOR THE MINISTRIES OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE (IN BILLIONS OF LEMPIRAS), 2014-2017

Entity	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Ministry of Security	4.0	3.9	6.1	6.3	20.3
Ministry of Defense	4.5	5.4	6.8	7.0	23.7

Source: Prepared based on data from the TSC, ASJ and La Gaceta

Until 2013, the annual budget of the Ministry of Security surpassed that of the Ministry of Defense. This trend changed in 2014 with the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP), showing that the Ministry of Defense became the public security funding priority.

However, among the security, defense, and justice sector institutions, the Ministry of Security saw the biggest budget increase, at 57.5% over the four years, exceeding the increases of 55.6% for defense, 54.4% for the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and 15.8% for the Judiciary.

TABLE 10**COMPARISON OF BUDGETS AMONG SECURITY, JUSTICE AND DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS (IN BILLIONS OF LEMPIRAS), 2014-2017**

Entity	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total	Increase over 4 years
Ministry of Defense	4.5	5.4	6.8	7.0	23.7	+57.5%
Ministry of Security	4.0	3.9	6.1	6.3	20.3	+55.6%
Judiciary	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.2	7.9	+15.8%
Public Prosecutor's Office	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.7	5.4	+54.4%

Source: Prepared based on data from the TSC, ASJ and La Gaceta

Of the 10.5 billion lempiras (\$422 million) collected through the Population Security Tax between 2014 and 2017, the Ministry of Security received 4.7 billion lempiras (\$188 million), which exceeded the 4.3 billion lempiras (\$172 million)

allocated to the Ministry of Defense and the 935 million lempiras (\$37.4 million) allocated to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Judiciary. Expressed as a percentage, the security sector received 45% of the funds.

TABLE 11**DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS RAISED THROUGH THE POPULATION SECURITY TAX (IN MILLIONS OF LEMPIRAS), 2014-2017**

Entity	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total	%
Ministry of Security	695	988	1,401	1,649	4,732	45%*
Ministry of Defense	1,476	1,471	660	719	4,324	41%*
Public Prosecutor's Office	56	183	140	225	605	6%*
Judiciary	104	56	90.5	80	330	3%*

Source: Prepared based on data from the transparency portal for the Population Security Tax (tasadeseguridad.hn)

*Due to rounding differences, the precise sum of the annual figures may vary slightly from totals

In terms of how the Ministry of Security's budget was spent, 35.8% was allocated to preventive police services, 30.6% to activities common

to all the different police services, 24.7% to investigatory services, 5.3% to traffic policing, and 3.6% to police training.

TABLE 12**INTERNAL ALLOCATION OF MINISTRY OF SECURITY SPENDING (IN PERCENTAGES), 2014-2017**

Services	2014	2015	2016	2017
Preventative Policing	47.0%	42.0%	49.0%	13%
Investigation	11.0%	11.0%	14.0%	52%
Traffic Safety	6.0%	7.0%	7.0%	2%
Police Education System	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	7%
Common activities	34.0%	38.0%	28.0%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Prepared based on data from FOSDEH and the Ministry of Finance

From 2014 to 2017, 7.2 billion lempiras (\$288 million) were spent on the preventative system, 6.2 billion lempiras (\$248 million) on activities common to all services, 5 billion lempiras (\$200 million) on investigating crimes, 1 billion lempiras (\$40 million) on traffic policing, and 721 million lempiras (\$28.8 million) on the police education system.

The most significant change in budgeting priorities occurred in 2017, when the budget for investigation services was increased by 283% and that of the education system by 261.5%. Meanwhile, the preventive services budget was reduced by 72.6% and the one for traffic policing by 70.5%.

TABLE 13**INTERNAL ALLOCATION OF MINISTRY OF SECURITY SPENDING (IN MILLIONS OF LEMPIRAS), 2014-2017**

Services	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Preventative Policing	1,800	1,638	2,989	819	7,246
Investigation	440	429	854	3,276	4,999
Traffic Safety	240	273	427	126	1,066
Police Education System	80	78	122	441	721
Common Activites	1,360	1,482	1,708	1,638	6,188

Source: Prepared based on data from FOSDEH and the Ministry of Finance

Life Insurance, Health Insurance, and Other Benefits

In terms of social security, under the Organic Law of 2017 and the Social Security Law, all members of the police force have a right to receive health services from the Honduran Social Security Institute (*Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social, IHSS*).

Members of the police also have a right to life insurance provided by the Ministry of Security. This insurance should have special provisions for death in the line of duty and for the risks to which members of the police force are exposed. The life insurance may not be less than 30 minimum monthly wages at the highest rank attained by the police officer, and it should be paid out to the designated beneficiaries.

Additionally, police careers have a duration of thirty-five (35) years of active service or until the requirements established in the Pension System for Special Risks (*Régimen Previsional de Riesgos Especiales, RRE*) and of the Military Pension Institute (*Instituto de Previsión Militar,*

IPM) have been met.

Information on salaries was requested from the PNH for this report, but authorities did not provide the information, with the explanation that “it would take time to compile it.” As indicated in this Monitor’s report on transparency, the PNH has no information whatsoever published on the Single Transparency Platform for information required regardless of whether it was requested. The legally required list for this institution of matters declared confidential and classified is not on the platform either.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Over the last 30 years, community policing has been among the security projects with the most support from the international community but also among those farthest from becoming a reality in Honduras.

The first proposals for restoring confidence in the police through closer ties with the community emerged in the 1990s.

TABLE 14

TIMELINE OF THE PROCESS OF CREATING COMMUNITY POLICING, 1998–2017

Period	Model for implementation	President of Honduras
1998	The first steps towards a preventative police service were taken, and later officers were trained in community policing models in the United States, Spain, Brazil, and Israel.	Carlos Flores Facussé (Liberal Party)
2002–2006	The “Safer Community” project to create a community police unit in 76 neighborhoods in 9 cities in Honduras. The initiative—backed by the United States, European Union, and Japan—also involved comprehensive crime prevention at the municipal and community levels.	Ricardo Maduro (National Party)

2006-2009	Citizens for Security Roundtables, where the population would keep the National Police updated on illegal or violent acts they observe in their neighborhoods.	José Manuel Zelaya (Liberal Party)
2008	An attempt was made to train police officers in the Japanese community model called Koban: a community surveillance mechanism intended to prevent crime.	José Manuel Zelaya (Liberal Party)
2010	Start of advisory work by the Colombian police, beginning with members of the Police Investigations Department, who supported internal police intelligence processes, and ultimately training more than 700 officers.	Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party)
2012	“Safer Municipalities” Project.	Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party)
2012	Start of the Gang Resistance Education and Training Program (GREAT), with the backing of the United States government and the aim of achieving “safer communities.” Since the program began in 2012, 178 instructors were trained and certified by the U.S. Embassy.	Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party)
2012	Creation of the Commission for Public Security Reform (CRSP).	Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party)
2013	Creation of Community Policing Stations (<i>Estaciones de Policía Comunitaria</i> , EPC) and Departmental Community Policing Stations (<i>Estaciones Departamentales de Policía Comunitaria</i> , EDPC).	Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party)
2014	New proposal for the National Community Policing Service Model.	Juan Orlando Hernández (National Party)
2015	Approval of the National Police Education Policy, which lays out the path to community policing, with a focus on professional police skills.	Juan Orlando Hernández (National Party)

In 2017, the Honduras Model (*Modelo Catracho*) strategy was also implemented within the PNH, in partnership with the United States Department of State. This program gave priority to establishing relationships between police

officers and communities. The strategy broke large municipalities down into smaller zones to foster a better relationship between police and the community, generating community surveillance based on confidence in the police.³⁸

In 2012, the CRSP made one of the most significant pushes to transform the underlying doctrine and pedagogical principles of police training by placing a community-oriented philosophy and respect for human rights at its center. The main result this commission set out to achieve was proposing amendments to the organic laws of the PNH and of the Public Prosecutor's Office (with their respective regulations), as well as overhauling the curriculum of the police system and the code of ethics of the National Police. These documents were delivered to the National Congress to be reviewed and passed into law, but the amendments were never made.

The re-militarizing of public security is incompatible with a community policing philosophy. The high-level political will needed to create a community police force was never

present, and the international development and cooperation community (especially the United States) was always more interested in the initiative than the local authorities themselves.³⁹

Distrust of the police prevails in communities, as does defenselessness in the face of the widespread violence. Surveys conducted by the University Institute for Democracy, Peace and Security (*Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, IUDPAS*) confirm this gap between the population and the PNH. In 2014, just 5.2% of the population had "high confidence" in the police;⁴⁰ in 2016, 58.6% of those surveyed said they distrusted the Police.⁴¹ Of all the institutions in the security and justice sector, only the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judiciary, the Office of the President, and the National Congress inspire less confidence than the PNH.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANAPO	National Police Academy
CCOP	Police Leadership Training Center
CCPCS	Training Center for Police Agents, Classes, and Noncommissioned Officers
CEDTPN	Special Commission to Purge and Transform the Honduran National Police
CES	Council of Higher Education
CETEP	Center for Technical Police Specialties Schools
CIP	Police Training Center
COBRA	Special Operations Command
CONADEH	National Human Rights Commission
CONASIN	National Domestic Security Council
CRSP	Commission for Public Security Reform
CSJ	Supreme Court of Justice
DESEI	Special Directorate for Special Investigatory Services
DGEP	General Directorate for Police Education
DGIC	General Directorate for Criminal Investigation
DGPP	General Directorate for Preventive Policing
DGSEP	General Directorate for Special Preventive Services
DIC	Criminal Investigation Department
DIDADPOL	Directorate of Police Disciplinary Affairs
DIECP	Directorate for Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career
DLCN	Directorate for the Fight against Drug Trafficking
DNAI	National Directorate for Internal Affairs
DNEP	National Directorate for Police Education
DNFE	National Directorate for Special Forces
DNI	National Investigation Directorate
DNIC	National Directorate for Criminal Investigation
DNPA	National Directorate for Anti-Drug Policing
DNPP	National Directorate for Preventive Policing
DNPSC	National Directorate for Prevention and Community Security
DNPSE	National Directorate for Protection and Special Services
DNSEI	National Directorate for Special Investigatory Services
DNSEP	National Directorate for Special Preventive Services
DNSPF	National Directorate for Border Police Services
DNT	National Directorate of Traffic

DNVT	National Directorate for Roads and Transportation
DPI	Police Investigations Department
ECOP	Police Officer Training School
EIC	School of Criminal Investigation
FMM	Myrna Mack Foundation
FUSEP	Public Security Force
IHSS	Honduran Institute of Social Security
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPM	Military Pension Institute
ISEP	Higher Institute of Police Education
ITP	Technical Police Institute
IUDOP	University Institute for Public Opinion
IUDPAS	University Institute for Democracy, Peace and Security
MACCIH	Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras
MP	Public Prosecutor's Office
OAS	Organization of American States
ONV	National Violence Observatory
PMOP	Military Police of Public Order
PNH	Honduran National Police
RRE	Pension System for Special Risks
SEP	Police Education System
SIF	Seattle International Foundation
TIGRES	Special Response Team and Intelligence Troop
TSC	Superior Court of Accounts
UCA	José Simeón Cañas Central American University
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPH	Honduras National Police University
WOLA	Washington Office on Latin America

NOTES

¹ A detailed list of indicators is available in English at www.wola.org/cam and in Spanish at www.wola.org/es/cam.

² Constitution of the Republic of Honduras. https://www.tsc.gob.hn/web/leyes/Constitucion_de_la_republica.pdf

³ Ley Orgánica de la Policía Nacional de Honduras. 1998. <https://www.tsc.gob.hn/biblioteca/index.php/leyes/62-ley-organica-de-la-policia-nacional-de-honduras>

⁴ La Militarización de la Seguridad Pública en Honduras. CEDOH. 2015. http://www.cedoh.org/Biblioteca_CEDOH/archivos/00229%20LA%20MILITARIZACION%20DE%20LA%20SEGURIDAD%20PUBLICA%20EN%20HONDURAS.pdf

⁵ Boletines Nacionales. ONV. IUDPAS. <https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletines-del-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales>

⁶ Percepción ciudadana sobre inseguridad y victimización en Honduras. IUDPAS. 2014. <https://tzibalnaah.unah.edu.hn/handle/123456789/12534>

⁷ “A cinco de cada diez hondureños la Policía Nacional les transmite miedo”. In *El Heraldo*. April 7, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.elheraldo.hn/alfrente/565227-209/a-cinco-de-cada-diez-hondurenos-lapolicia-nacional-les-transmite-miedo>.

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²⁷ The directors of the police who were removed are the Commissioner-Generals José Luís Muñoz Liconá; Ricardo Ramírez del Cid; Juan Carlos Bonilla; and Ramón Sabillón.

²⁸ The directors of the police who were removed are the Commissioner-Generals José Luís Muñoz Liconá; Ricardo Ramírez del Cid; Juan Carlos Bonilla; and Ramón Sabillón.

²⁹ The “others” category includes dismissals, mandatory retirement, final court judgments, disabilities, and deaths.

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approved the Fiduciary Law for the Administration of the Population Protection and Security Fund, selecting the Central Bank of Honduras (BCH) as the trustee. Through this tax, the State collected 10.5 billion lempiras (422 million dollars) between 2014 and 2017.

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THE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND SECURITY (INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO EN DEMOCRACIA, PAZ Y SEGURIDAD, IUDPAS) is affiliated with the Faculty of Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH). It was created to strengthen the research capacity of the UNAH, promote multidisciplinary in methodological theoretical approaches in the areas of security, public policies, city studies, democracy and development, issues related to youth, as well as to strengthen the competences of different university professionals.

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The Central America Monitor is a subregional project that seeks to assess the level of progress being made by the countries of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in the areas of strengthening the rule of law, reducing violence, combating corruption and organized crime, and protecting human rights through the use of a series of indicators. The project also monitors and analyzes international cooperation programs in the aforementioned areas.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the Latin American Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Seattle International Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, and the Moriah Fund for their financial support and excellent advice that has made this project possible.

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