



Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas



University Institute  
for Public Opinion



AP Photo: Moisés Castillo

## THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE IN EL SALVADOR

Evaluating the Professionalization of the Civilian  
Police Force

AUGUST 2020 | SERIES 1



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Cover: AP Photo – Moisés Castillo  
First edition: August 2020

San Salvador, El Salvador  
August 2020 | Series 1

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# INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the problem of insecurity and impunity has deeply affected the people of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, making this region (known as the Northern Triangle of Central America) one of the most violent in the world. High levels of violence, corruption, and impunity have eroded the capacity of the states to develop accessible and efficient institutions, and address the needs of their populations.

The absence of effective responses has weakened citizens' confidence in state institutions, leading to an alarming number of people who have been internally displaced or forced to migrate to other countries to escape the violence and lack of economic opportunities.

Against this backdrop, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the University Institute for Public Opinion (Iudop) of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador, the University Institute on Democracy, Peace and Security (IUDPAS) of Honduras, and the Myrna Mack Foundation (FMM) of Guatemala have developed a tool for monitoring and evaluating the policies and strategies currently being implemented in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to reduce insecurity and violence, strengthen the rule of law, improve transparency and accountability, protect human rights, and fight corruption. This initiative has been made possible thanks to the support of the Latin America Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Tinker Foundation, the Seattle International Foundation (SIF), and the Moriah Fund.

## THE CENTRAL AMERICA MONITOR

The Central America Monitor is based on the premise that accurate, objective, and complete data and information are necessary to reduce the high levels of violence and insecurity, and establish rule of law and governance in a democratic state. This will allow efforts to move beyond abstract discussions of reform to specific measures of change.

The Monitor is based on a series of more than 100 quantitative and qualitative indicators that allow a more profound level of analysis of the successes or setbacks made in eight key areas in each of the three countries.<sup>1</sup> More than a comprehensive list, the indicators seek to identify a way to examine and assess the level of progress of the three countries in strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions. The indicators seek to identify the main challenges in each of the selected areas and examine how institutions are (or are not) being strengthened over time. The Monitor uses information from different sources, including official documents and statistics, surveys, interviews, information from emblematic cases, and analysis of existing laws and regulations.

The indicators were developed over several months in a process that included an extensive review of international standards and consultation with experts. The eight areas analyzed by the Monitor include:

1. Strengthening the capacity of the justice system;
2. Cooperation with anti-impunity commissions;
3. Combatting corruption;
4. Tackling violence and organized crime;

## 5. Strengthening civilian police forces;

6. Limiting the role of the armed forces in public security activities;
7. Protecting human rights;
8. Improving transparency.

The Monitor reports are published by area and by country. The first series of reports will serve as the baseline for subsequent analysis, which will be updated annually. Each annual series of reports will be analyzed in comparison with reports from the previous year. This allows researchers, civil society organizations, and other actors to assess the level of progress in strengthening the rule of law and reducing insecurity.

The first round of Monitor reports will primarily focus on data sets from an approximate 4-year time period, 2014 to 2017, in order to provide a snapshot of Central America's institutions.

The Monitor will serve as a tool for searchable, easy-to-comprehend data, delineating trends, progress, patterns, and gaps within and between the three countries of the Northern Triangle. The data, graphics, charts, and reports will be available on the Monitor's website.

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## ABOUT THE RESEARCH FOR THIS REPORT

The quantitative data in this report was obtained via the bibliographic review of official reports, institutional annals, and relevant information available on the official transparency web pages of the National Civilian Police (*Policia Nacional Civil*, PNC) the Ministry of Finance and The National Public Security Academy (*Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública*, ANSP).

In addition, requests for statistical information were made via the Public Information Access Law (*Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública*, LAIP) of El Salvador, which establishes a specific process by which government agencies must receive information requests and respond within a set timeframe.

This report primarily analyzes statistical data provided by the PNC and ANSP. This information sheds light on internal police functions, the extent of investment in training for police personnel, and the amount of funding the PNC receives to carry out crime prevention and policing roles.

# KEY FINDINGS

- A high percentage of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (*Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, MJSP*) go to the National Civilian Police (*Policía Nacional Civil, PNC*): from 2014 to 2017, the PNC received 60 percent of the MJSP's budget. Despite this, the highest amount the PNC received during this period was over \$290 million (in 2015). The PNC's funding declined by 5.04 percent over the period covered by this report.
- Payroll expenses account for the vast majority of the PNC's budget, some 70 percent of its annual allocation.
- Official PNC information states that there is approximately one police facility for every 56 square kilometers. Police stations are the most basic kind of facility; they have a very limited number of officers and more vulnerable infrastructure.
- Data shows that between 2014 and 2017, the police force numbered around 26,000 members in total. Over the course of this period, its personnel shrank by 7.2 percent, from 27,887 members in 2014 to 26,025 members in 2017.
- Data on gender from 2014 to 2017 shows that most members of the police were men, who made up over 80 percent of the police force. During the same period, between 13 percent and 15 percent of police officers were women.
- Over the years covered by this report, the proportion of women in the PNC rose by 10.2 percent, from 3,635 in 2014 to 4,007 in 2017.
- According to official data, slightly more than a third of the police force (35 percent) had been working for the PNC for 20 years or more in 2016 and 2017, meaning they joined the police between 1991 and 1996. Only 18 percent of all police officers had been working for the PNC for five years or less during that same period, based on official PNC statistics.
- In terms of age, between 2016 and 2017, the youngest member of the PNC in El Salvador was 22, and the oldest 85. The average age of police officers in 2016 and 2017 was 42.
- In 2016 and 2017, 4 percent of police officers were between the ages of 61 and 85. Data also shows that between 2016 and 2017, 55 percent of the police force was over age 40.
- Based on official PNC data for 2016, 20,732 members of the police were at the basic level of the hierarchy: 18,472 were classified as agents, 1,150 as corporals, and 1,110 as sergeants. This figure rose to 20,838 in 2017, with 17,931 agents, 1,809 corporals, and 1,098 sergeants. For both years, these ranks accounted for approximately 80 percent of the entire police force.

- Between 2016 and 2017, some 70 percent of personnel assigned to specialized units were composed of police from the lowest ranks.
- In terms of police training, data shows that from 2014 to 2017, the budget for the National Public Security Academy (*Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, ANSP*) fell 10 percent, from \$12,142,505 in 2014 to \$10,815,521 in 2017.
- The personnel assigned to the Specialized Higher Level Institute of the National Public Security Academy (*Instituto Especializado de Nivel Superior de la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, IES-ANSP*) from 2014 to 2017 numbered no more than 500, of whom around 29 percent were personnel assigned to areas related to maintaining and controlling the institution's assets and approximately 33 percent were responsible for trainings designed for members of the police.
- A notable amount of the ANSP's resources go toward training security guards for private companies. From 2014 to 2017 alone, 6521 non-police students graduated to work in the private security sector, compared to 2,045 police officers.
- Based on the annual surveys conducted by the University Institute for Public Opinion at the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (*Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Iudop-UCA*), from 2014 to 2017, approximately 6 out of every 10 Salvadorans had little to no trust in the police. In 2016, 51.1 percent of the population considered the PNC to be corrupt to some degree.
- Prior to 2014, the Inspector General's Office operated from within the PNC. Oversight organizations and experts strongly criticized this for decades, as it allowed police to be investigated by other police. The lack of a truly independent Inspector General's Office was a significant barrier to investigating alleged police misconduct and enforcing accountability, since the PNC generally maintained a code of silence regarding implication of wrongdoing by its members. In 2014, the government enacted the Organic Law of the Office of the Inspector General of Public Security (*Ley Orgánica de la Inspectoría General de Seguridad Pública*), which transferred the Inspector General's Office to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, representing the first attempt to separate the police oversight body from the PNC's organizational structure.
- The executive branch has not yet developed a policy to regulate the Organic Law of the National Public Security Academy, which was passed in 1992 and is supposed to lay out official policies for how police are promoted, among other areas. As of the publication of this report, researchers found that these regulations were still in the process of being approved. The lack of current regulations leaves a policy vacuum, since the mechanisms for promoting PNC officers have, since 1999, been established by temporary and special legislative decrees, a situation

which does not provide a stable criteria for promoting police officers according to their rank and level within the police hierarchy.

- When the National Public Security Academy (*Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, ANSP*) became an Institute of Higher Education, it created the Vocational Police Sciences program (*Técnico en Ciencias Policiales*). This program is designed to provide ANSP trainings with more academic coursework. The first cohort graduated from the program in 2017; it included 111 students, 85 percent of whom were men and 15 percent women.
- Information from the National Public Security Academy from 2014 to 2017 shows that training courses in the Philosophy of Community Policing only took place in 2014 and 2015. Compared to 2014, the number of students who graduated from this course in 2015 reduced drastically, from 1,256 students to 471 (a decline of more than 60 percent). These figures reveal a stark contrast to official government discourse that has publicly touted the PNC's adoption of a community policing model.
- Official PNC data show that the number of police personnel assigned to internal oversight units increased by a combined 26.3 percent, from 247 to 321 members, between 2014 and 2017. The increase in the number of personnel assigned to internal oversight units during this period corresponded with a decrease in the overall number of members in the police force. Accordingly, the ratio of total PNC personnel to personnel in oversight units decreased, from 113 in 2014 to 83 in 2017.
- Data provided by the PNC show that 83.4 percent of police personnel investigated between 2014 and 2017 fell under the basic level of the PNC ranking hierarchy. Some 8.1 percent held positions within the executive level, 6.1 percent were administrative staff, and 2.4 percent were at the superior level. The data also reveals that most officers who were investigated held the lowest ranks within each of these levels.
- Between 2014 and 2017, investigations carried out by the Internal Affairs Unit under the auspices of the Prosecutor General's Office registered increases in offenses allegedly committed by police; these involved alleged threats, injuries, theft, unlawful search and entry, procedural fraud, homicide (simple and aggravated), and deprivation of liberty. For example, investigations into police conduct for offenses related to unlawful search and entry and threats increased some 163 percent, while investigations into offenses related to deprivation of liberty and homicide increased by 200 percent.
- Statistics processed by the UCA's University Observatory on Human Rights (*Observatorio Universitario de Derechos Humanos, OUDH*) on the number of complaints for crimes of torture committed by members of the police and military filed between 2014 and 2017 reveal the concerning fact that most of these crimes (73.8 percent) were attributed to members of the police..



# THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE IN EL SALVADOR

## Evaluating The Professionalization Of The Civilian Police Force

El Salvador's National Civilian Police (*Policía Nacional Civil*, PNC) was established in the early 1990s in the midst of a profound political revolution: the end of the civil war that had lasted more than a decade, the demobilization of the guerrillas and their transformation into a political party, the restructuring of the military, and the creation of institutions providing checks and balances.<sup>2</sup>

Its creation was marred by the infiltration of agents from former Salvadoran security forces—the Treasury Police (*Policía de Hacienda*) and the National Guard (*Guardia Nacional*)—who were responsible for grave human rights violations during the armed conflict.<sup>3</sup> But the carryover from these former security forces was not exclusively responsible for the PNC's degradation, which can also be traced to the incorporation of members of the armed forces and guerrillas.<sup>4</sup>

This flaw in the origins of the police force has limited the effectiveness of its operations and made it more vulnerable to corruption. These two specific problems have led to low levels of trust among citizens.

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### CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The decree founding El Salvador's National Civilian Police was published on August 10, 1992,<sup>5</sup> but in 2001 lawmakers decided that decree did not meet the demands of the time

and passed a new law with the same title.<sup>6</sup> Then in 2008, rules for the police's disciplinary system were set forth in an independent law, the Police Discipline Law (*Ley Disciplinaria Policial*).<sup>7</sup>

From 2014 to 2017, the Organic Law of the National Civilian Police was only amended once. In 2015, one of the most violent years since the end of the war, the law was amended to make private security agency contractors or shareholders or people linked to any stage of the process of trading firearms ineligible for the position of Director General of the Police.

In 2014, there was another amendment related to internal controls for police activity—the Organic Law of the Office of the Inspector General of Public Security (*Ley Orgánica de la Inspectoría General de Seguridad Pública*) was enacted. Prior to this, the Inspector General's Office operated from within the PNC, a model which received criticism from domestic oversight organizations and experts for decades since it allowed police to be investigated by other police. This model represented a significant barrier to gaining objective understanding of incidents and achieving accountability, since the PNC generally maintained a code of silence regarding implication of wrongdoing by its members. The transfer of this role to the Office of the Inspector General of Public Security represented the first attempt to separate the control and oversight body from the PNC's organizational structure.<sup>8</sup>

As for the PNC's discipline system, 2015 also saw a broad reform that included an article of

exemption from administrative liability when so decided by a judge and when the pre-established requirements in criminal law are met. The reform also amended 11 articles. One modification established that inspectors would be the operational agents to conduct the investigation requested by the Disciplinary Tribunal, the Office of the Inspector General, or other disciplinary body. Other amendments specified the composition and requirements for the members of the Court of Appeals of the Office of the Inspector General and of the Regional Disciplinary Court, and the Inspector General's ability to re-open preliminary investigations that had been dropped, among other changes.

With regards to serving as part of the police force, the Police Career Law, passed in 1996, was reformed more than once between 2014 and 2017. The first reform, in 2015, amended nine provisions. The most relevant changes were: a) allowing basic level officers to participate in courses for the rank of deputy inspector, provided they have a university degree and no record of unresolved disciplinary actions; b) reserving 30% of job openings at the deputy inspector rank for external hires; c) eliminating the need to earn a specific score on a predetermined scale in order to be promoted; and d) determining that those who meet the credentials for promotion will be fit and ready to apply for promotion, provided the criteria established by the authorities are followed.

The two amendments in 2016 established leaves of absence for both men and women in the police force in case of birth or adoption of a child. Finally, the 2017 reform changed the process for candidates who meet the requirements for entering the police force, who must be inducted by the Director of the PNC once they have finished and passed the respective course.

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
## **POLICE FUNDING**

As explained in previous Central America Monitor reports, identifying the funding for the main security and justice institutions is key to gaining an understanding of their level of transparency and actual ability to invest.

In El Salvador, a high percentage of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security go to the PNC: from 2014 to 2017, it received 60% of the MJSP's budget. However, two key observations can be made: the first is that the MJSP's percent allocation to the PNC declined by 5.04% over the period covered by this report, despite an increase in absolute terms from \$256,107,340 in 2014 to \$269,013,448 in 2017. The second aspect is that the proportion of the overall MJSP budget allocated to the PNC dropped by more than 10%. In other words, 71.91% of the MJSP's funds for 2014 were allocated to the PNC, a figure which fell to 62% in 2017.

## GRAPH 1

### APPROVED BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE, 2014-2017




Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgeting Law 2014-2017

As already mentioned in other Monitor reports, most public institutions revise their budgets over the course of the fiscal year so they can meet their annual obligations. In the case of the PNC,

these revisions expanded the budget between 14% and 38% in 2014-2017. Financial statistics from the period under study show that 99% of the budget was executed.

## GRAPH 2

### NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE BUDGET, MODIFIED AND EXECUTED, 2014-2017



Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgeting Law 2014-2017

Based on information provided by the police, from 2015 to 2017, more than \$320 million per year was spent on activities related to public security nationwide. But as noted in previous ludop research, the funds received by public

institutions primarily go to paying the salaries of their employees.<sup>9</sup> The PNC is no exception: between 2014 and 2017, more than 70% of the funds allocated to that institution went to covering payroll expenses.

**TABLE 1**  
**ANNUAL BUDGET ALLOCATED TO SALARIES AND COMPENSATION, 2014-2017**

Year	Budget
2014	\$ 239,483,580.00
2015	\$ 249,676,165.00
2016	\$ 257,248,870.00
2017	\$ 264,285,235.00

*Source: Information Request PNC-UAIP-96-2020*


## OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

For the purposes of this study, the police's operational capacity is its geographical presence, and for the Central America Monitor this is a proxy indicator of the police forces' territorial deployment. Based on the PNC's national directory, the police force has approximately one facility per 56 square kilometers. The main police facilities are distributed and classified by hierarchical level as regional offices (35), sub-regional offices (71), police stations (254), and rural police stations (14).

Regional offices are police facilities with authority over all police units within their district. Regional offices are distributed according to the characteristics of each geographical department. Sub-regional offices are smaller units operating under the authority of the regional offices, while police stations deal most closely with citizens, as they are the most widespread. Importantly, police stations are basic units with a very limited number of officers and more vulnerable infrastructure.

## FIGURE 1

### REGIONAL OFFICES, SUB-REGIONAL OFFICES, AND POLICE STATIONS IN EL SALVADOR



Source: PNC


The types of units listed above are the main places where the PNC's operations are carried out, but over time specialized units have also been created. These include the Specialized Institutional Unit for Women in Violent Situations of the Office of Citizen Services and Complaints (*Unidad Institucional de Atención Especializada a las Mujeres en Situación de Violencia de la Oficina de Denuncia y Atención Ciudadana*, UNIMUJER-ODAC), which operate across the country, 911 emergency centers, and

other important units that contribute to the work of the police.

Another factor that impacts the police's operational capacity is the number of officers it has for performing its tasks. Data shows that between 2014 and 2017, the police force numbered around 26,000 members in total. Over the course of this period, its personnel shrank by 7.2%, from 27,887 members in 2014 to 26,025 members in 2017.

## GRAPH 3

### POLICE STAFF, DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER, 2016-2017



Source: PNC, 2018


Data on gender from 2014 to 2017 shows that most members of the police were men, who made up over 80% of the police force. During the same period, between 13% and 15% of the police force were women. Notably, over the years covered by this report, the proportion of women in the PNC rose by 10.2%, from 3,635 in 2014 to 4,007 in 2017.

In terms of how long members of the police have been serving, data shows that in 2016 and

2017, most officers had been working for the police for 10 years or more (over 17,000 people at the time). Additionally, slightly more than a third of the police force (35%) had been working for the PNC for 20 years or more in 2016-2017, meaning they joined the police between 1991 and 1996. Only 18% of all police officers had been working for the PNC for five years or less during that same period, according to official PNC statistics.

## GRAPH 4

### SENIORITY OF POLICE STAFF, 2016-2017



Source: PNC, 2018

In terms of age, in 2016 and 2017, the youngest member of the PNC in El Salvador was 22, and the oldest 85. The average age of police officers in 2016 and 2017 was 42. Official information on the age distribution of the police reveals that between 10.8% and 13% of officers were

between the ages of 22 and 30 in 2016 and 2017. Importantly, around 4% of the police force was between the ages of 61 and 85. Data also shows that between 2016 and 2017, 55% of the police force was over age 40.

## TABLE 2

### POLICE STAFF BY SEX AND AGE RANGE, 2016-2017

Age Range	2016				2017			
	Men	Women	Total	%	Men	Women	Total	%
25 or younger	129	54	183	0.70	400	151	551	2.12
26-30	1914	723	2637	10.09	2082	759	2841	10.92
31-35	3906	842	4748	18.18	3755	834	4589	17.63
36-40	3509	428	3937	15.07	3368	418	3786	14.55
41-45	4692	590	5282	20.22	4575	584	5159	19.82

Age Range	2016				2017			
	Men	Women	Total	%	Men	Women	Total	%
46-50	4256	577	4833	18.50	4162	558	4720	18.14
51-55	1997	343	2340	8.96	1941	342	2283	8.77
56-60	997	205	1202	4.60	969	201	1170	4.50
61 or older	795	165	960	3.68	766	160	926	3.56

Source: PNC, 2018

These statistics highlight the major challenge of guaranteeing decent retirement conditions for the 8% of employees who are seniors. The information available shows the aging police force to be a problem in terms of operational capacity and level of professionalism, as well as level of technical expertise. Prior Monitor reports pointed out that between 2016 and 2017, approximately 70% of personnel assigned to specialized units fall within the least qualified categories of the police hierarchy—corporals and agents.<sup>10</sup> Appendix 1 to this report demonstrates that this situation is not limited to specialized units of the police, since units like the Surveillance Control and Monitoring Center, the Police Information and Operations Control Center, police intelligence departments, investigations departments, and other units are experiencing the same trend.

Based on official PNC data for 2016, 20,732 members of the police were at the basic level of the hierarchy: 18,472 were classified as agents, 1,150 as corporals, and 1,110 as sergeants. This figure rose to 20,838 people in 2017, with 17,931 agents, 1,809 corporals, and 1,098 sergeants. During both years, these ranks accounted for approximately 80% of the entire police force.

This reveals the difficulties for both professionalism and promotion within the PNC, as well as the accompanying lack of financial incentives for police officers. The more police officers there are at the lowest levels, the more difficult it is to achieve a technically and scientifically qualified police force. Also, a large number of members of the police at the lowest categories means that most salaries will be low.

## TRAINING FOR POLICE OFFICERS

### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLICE TRAINING INSTITUTION

The entity responsible for training police officers is separate from the PNC. Like the PNC, the National Public Security Academy (*Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, ANSP*) is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and was created in 1992. The law creating the ANSP grants it administrative and

financial autonomy. This means it has its own funding and is independent from the resources allocated to the PNC.<sup>11</sup>

The main duties of the ANSP include providing professional training to members of the National Civilian Police, creating selection plans, administering the tests for entering the police force, and evaluating police officers.

As an academic entity, the ANSP's organization consists of: a) a director who has the same rank



as the director general of the PNC and who is chosen by the president of the Republic; and b) an academic board that performs comptroller and regulatory functions for the ANSP.

The presidency has yet to draft regulations for the ANSP's Organic Law, which was passed in 1992. Upon completion of this report, it was found that the regulations were in the process of being approved. This situation creates a vacuum because the mechanisms for promoting PNC officers have, since 1999, been established by temporary and special legislative decrees, a situation which does not provide a stable criteria for promoting police officers according to their rank and level within the police hierarchy. This regulation's absence has hindered the creation of mechanisms for comprehensive and ongoing evaluation of police officers, which are essential to the process of constantly refining the police.

The executive branch granted the ANSP a new status as a Higher Education Institute (*Instituto de Educación Superior, IES*) in 2013,<sup>12</sup> and its bylaws were approved by the


Ministry of Education in 2017.<sup>13</sup> As part of this transformation, the IES-ANSP converted its Office of the Director General to an Office of the President and created an Office of the Vice President that oversees an Office of the Dean, a Social Research and Outreach Division, an Administrative Division, and a Selection and Entry Department. However, this organizational structure was only in place from May 12, 2017 to August 15, 2018. In 2019, it published a new organizational structure that brought back the Office of the Director General, who legally represents the IES-ANSP.

## FUNDING FOR TRAINING POLICE OFFICERS

According to the official records of El Salvador's Ministry of the Treasury, the IES-ANSP receives approximately 4% of the PNC's total budget allocation. The data shows that from 2014 to 2017, the IES-ANSP's budget shrank by 10%, from \$12,142,505 in 2014 to \$10,815,521 in 2017.

### GRAPH 5

#### BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE AND THE NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR PUBLIC SECURITY, 2014-2017




Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgeting Law 2014-2017

The personnel assigned to the IES-ANSP from 2014 to 2017 numbered no more than 500, of whom around 29% were personnel assigned to areas related to maintaining and controlling the PNC's assets and approximately 33% are responsible for trainings designed for members of the police.

Official data also reveals that between 2014 and 2017, the funds the IES-ANSP allocated to training personnel fell 18.5%, from \$5,751,410 in 2014 to \$4,694,296 in 2017. But to put this into perspective, the financial resources earmarked for training security personnel made up slightly more than 40% of the IES-ANSP's overall budget for the period covered by this report.

## GRAPH 6

### BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR PUBLIC SECURITY AND PROPORTION ASSIGNED TO TRAINING, 2014-2017



Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgeting Law 2014-2017

## SCOPE OF TRAINING FOR POLICE OFFICERS

Under the Police Career Law, the PNC hierarchy is organized into three levels: basic, executive, and superior. Each of these levels is in turn divided into three categories.<sup>14</sup> As mentioned in previous sections, most of the police force is at the basic level, especially at the ranks of corporal and agent, which comprise the operational teams in the field for public security, prevention, and surveillance, and sergeant, with the power to command operational personnel.

Meanwhile, the executive level consists of the categories directly related to surveillance and inspection, and the categories of the superior level are associated with planning and coordination activities. However, Article 14 of the Police Career Law does not clearly delimit the responsibilities of each category, which could pose difficulties for the operational organization of the police.

**FIGURE 2**  
**POLICE RANKS**

Basic level	Executive level	Superior level
Sergeant	Chief Inspector	Commissioner General
Corporal	Inspector	Commissioner
Agent	Deputy inspector	Deputy commissioner

*Source: Police Career Law*

The same law states that police officers' service record should reflect the training courses in which they participated while serving in the PNC. Article 46 of the Police Career Law reads: "The essential aim of refresher programs and courses shall be to maintain and increase the knowledge and capacity of police officers at all levels and in all categories [...]" Article 44 of this law also specifies that the PNC and the ANSP are responsible for planning and organizing these courses, seminars, and conferences.

Official data from the IES-ANSP seems to show a strong emphasis on recruiting and initial training at the basic level. According to ANSP statistics, 664 students began initial training at the basic level in 2014, 561 in 2015, and 499 in 2016. Following the gradual decline in the number of new students over these three years, there was an increase in 2017, with 836 enrollees at the basic level.<sup>15</sup> A total of 2,560 people enrolled at the basic level between 2014 and 2017. Of these, 744 were women (29.1%) and 1,816 were men (70.9%).

**TABLE 3**  
**PEOPLE WHO ENROLLED AT THE BASIC LEVEL AT RANK OF AGENT, 2014-2017**

Year	Promotion	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	110	330	175	53%	155	47%
	111	334	94	28%	240	72%
2015	112	283	44	16%	239	84%
	113	278	70	25%	208	75%
2016	114	262	65	25%	197	75%
	115	237	67	28%	170	72%
2017	116	511	132	26%	379	74%
	117	325	97	30%	228	70%

*Source: ANSP, 2019.*

*\*No enrollment numbers registered for Higher Level or Executive Level between 2014 and 2017.*

ANSP statistics record 5 basic-level graduations in 2014, with a total of 613 graduates. In 2015, 501 students graduated in 3 separate cohorts. In 2016, there were 4 graduations with a total of 454 students. Lastly, 2017 saw 3 cohorts at

the basic level, with a total of 477 graduates. Altogether, a total of 2,045 people graduated from the basic level between 2014 and 2017. Of this number, 574 were women (28.1%) and 1,471 were men (71.9%).

**TABLE 4**  
**PEOPLE WHO GRADUATED FROM BASIC LEVEL AT RANK OF AGENT, 2014-2017**

Year	Promotion	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	108	8	2	25%	6	75%
	109	2	0	0%	2	100%
	110	303	156	51%	147	49%
	110	2	1	50%	1	50%
	111	298	87	29%	211	71%
2015	112	261	35	13%	226	87%
	112	1	0	0%	1	100%
	113	239	62	26%	177	74%
2016	113	4	3	75%	1	25%
	114	240	58	24%	182	76%
	114	3	0	0%	3	100%
	115	207	56	27%	151	73%
2017	115	1	1	100%	0	0%
	116	474	113	24%	361	76%
	116	2	0	0%	2	100%

Source: ANSP, 2019.

\*No graduation numbers registered for Higher Level or Executive Level between 2014 and 2017

From 2014 to 2017, the ANSP held 6 graduations from courses to promote officers at the basic level to a new rank. Of the 1,253 students who graduated, 1,157 (92.3%) were men, and 96 (7.7%) were women. During the same period, 5 groups graduated from executive level promotion courses. Of the 349 graduates, 302 (86.5%) were men and 47 (13.5%) were women. Finally, during the period covered by this report, there was one graduation from a promotion course at the superior level, which

took place in 2014. This group had 31 students, 27 of whom were men (87.1%) and four of whom were women (12.9%). According to the statistics, a total of 1,633 people graduated from promotion courses between 2014 and 2017. Three quarters of all graduates (76.7%) were basic level students, while executive level students made up 21.4% of the total. Only 1.9% of graduates from promotion courses during this period were at the superior level.

**TABLE 5**

**PROMOTIONS AT THE BASIC, SUPERIOR, AND EXECUTIVE LEVELS, 2014-2017**

Level	Year	Promotion	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
Superior	2014	P-3 Promotion to Deputy Commissioner	31	4	13%	27	87%
Executive	2014	P-1 Internal Promotion to Deputy Inspector	143	19	13%	124	87%
	2014	P-2 Promotion from Sergeant with university degree to Deputy Inspector	45	7	16%	38	84%
	2015	P-4 Promotion to Chief Inspector	84	9	11%	75	89%
	2016	P-5 Promotion to Chief Inspector	40	6	15%	34	85%
	2017	P-6 Promotion to Inspector	37	6	16%	31	84%
Basic	2014	P-4 Promotion to Corporal	69	5	7%	64	93%
	2014	P-2 Promotion to Sergeant	26	1	4%	25	96%
	2016	P-2 Promotion to Sergeant	456	33	7%	423	93%
	2016		1	0	0%	1	100%
	2016	P-3 Promotion to Corporal (First group)	356	21	6%	335	94%
	2016	P-3 Promotion to Corporal (Second group)	345	36	10%	309	90%

Source: ANSP, 2019

When the Academy became an Institute of Higher Education, it created the Vocational Police Sciences program (*Técnico en Ciencias Policiales*), the first cohort of which graduated in 2017. This program is designed to provide ANSP

trainings with more academic coursework. The program lasts 80 weeks, with a four-week orientation course, 4 academic cycles covering 17 subjects, and 12 weeks of hands-on training on providing services to citizens.

**FIGURE 3**  
**VOCATIONAL POLICE SCIENCES PROGRAM CURRICULUM**

Pre-Enrollment Courses		FIRST YEAR				SECOND YEAR									
		Cycle I		Cycle II		Cycle III		Cycle IV							
1	First aid	1	DAFP-1	7	DAFP-1	12	DAFP-1	15	DAFP-1						
		Application of law to policing I		Application of law to policing II		Application of statistics to policing		Police investigations I							
		CP	4	CP	4	CP	4	CP	4						
2	Basic information technology	2	DH-1	8	DH-1	13	DH-1	16	DH-1						
		Human rights I		Ethics I		Oral and written expression techniques II		Technical English II							
		CP	4	CP	4	CP	3	CP	3						
3	Initial physical aptitude	3	TEOE-1	9	TEOE-1	14	TEOE-1	17	TEOE-1						
		Oral and written expression techniques I		Criminology		Workshop on police intervention III		Workshop on police intervention IV							
		CP	4	CP	3	CP	10	CP	10						
4	Workshop on developing social skills and sensitivity	4	IT-1	10	IT-1	<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Course No.</th> <th>Code</th> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Course Name</td> </tr> <tr> <th>Prerequisite</th> <th>No. of Credits</th> </tr> </table>				Course No.	Code	Course Name		Prerequisite	No. of Credits
Course No.	Code														
Course Name															
Prerequisite	No. of Credits														
		Technical English I		Community psychology											
		CP	3	CP	4										
5	Introduction to police doctrine and discipline	5	CSA-1	11	CSA-1	<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Course No.</th> <th>Code</th> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Course Name</td> </tr> <tr> <th>Prerequisite</th> <th>No. of Credits</th> </tr> </table>				Course No.	Code	Course Name		Prerequisite	No. of Credits
Course No.	Code														
Course Name															
Prerequisite	No. of Credits														
		Applied social sciences I		Workshop on police intervention II											
		CP	4	CP	4										
		6	TIP-1	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Police and disciplinary doctrine</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physical conditioning</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Police intervention exercise</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Firearms and shooting exercise</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Personal defense exercise</td> </tr> </table>		Police and disciplinary doctrine	Physical conditioning	Police intervention exercise	Firearms and shooting exercise	Personal defense exercise					
Police and disciplinary doctrine															
Physical conditioning															
Police intervention exercise															
Firearms and shooting exercise															
Personal defense exercise															
		Workshop on police intervention I													
		CP	4												
		Police and disciplinary doctrine		Police and disciplinary doctrine		Police and disciplinary doctrine									
		Physical conditioning		Physical conditioning		Physical conditioning									
		Police intervention exercise		Police intervention exercise		Police intervention exercise									
		Firearms and shooting exercise		Firearms and shooting exercise		Firearms and shooting exercise									
		Personal defense exercise		Personal defense exercise		Personal defense exercise									
		6		6		6									
		16 Weeks		16 Weeks		16 Weeks		16 Weeks							
		4 Weeks		6 Weeks		6 Weeks		6 Weeks							

Source: IES-ANSP Official Website

Literal transcription of the Pensum published by IES-ANSP

According to ANSP statistics, the first group to graduate from the Vocational Police Sciences

program had 111 students, most of whom were men (85%).

**TABLE 6**  
**NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM THE VOCATIONAL POLICE SCIENCES PROGRAM, 2014-2017**

Year	Promotion	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2017	P-1	111	17	15%	94	85%

Source: ANSP, 2019

ANSP data shows that 208 continuing studies courses for specific job positions were offered in 2014, and 127 in 2015. In 2016 and 2017, 169 and 172 courses of this type were held. The ANSP describes these courses as trainings on specific advancements or developments in the law, humanities, or other technical areas which

would improve police personnel's performance as well as overall PNC operations. From 2014 to 2017, a total of 676 continuing studies courses were offered to 14,821 students, 2,880 of whom were women (19.4%) and 11,941 of whom were men (80.6%).

**TABLE 7**  
**CONTINUING STUDIES COURSES: TRAININGS ON TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENTS, 2014-2017**

Year	Number of Courses	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	208	4,814	948	20%	3,866	80%
2015	127	3,115	579	19%	2,536	81%
2016	169	3,730	719	19%	3,011	81%
2017	172	3,162	634	20%	2,528	80%

*Source: ANSP, 2019*

The PNC also provides specialized continuing education courses to help improve the technical expertise of police officers aspiring to specialized units within the PNC. The ANSP reported a significant increase in the number of registrants for these types of courses after 2015. The data

shows that 72 courses of this type were held in 2014, and 55 in 2015. In 2016 and 2017, 67 and 94 courses of this type were held. From 2014 to 2017, a total of 288 specialization courses were taught to 10,337 students. Of these, 1,688 were women (16.3%) and 8,649 were men (83.7%).

**TABLE 8**  
**CONTINUING STUDIES COURSES: SPECIALIZATIONS, 2014-2017**

Year	Number of Courses	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	72	1,827	285	16%	1,542	84%
2015	55	1,535	312	20%	1,223	80%
2016	67	1,907	340	18%	1,567	82%
2017	94	5,068	751	15%	4,317	85%

*Source: ANSP, 2019*

According to ANSP statistics, a limited number of remedial courses were offered to people wishing

to reenlist in the PNC between 2014 and 2017. In 2015, 4 courses of this kind were offered, a

figure which dropped to 1 for each of the other three years. During the period covered by this report, seven remedial courses were offered,

with a total of 150 graduates. Of these, 10 were women (6.7%) and 140 were men (93.3%).

**TABLE 9**

**REMEDIAL COURSES FOR CANDIDATES SEEKING REENLISTMENT IN THE PNC, 2014-2017**

Year	Number of Courses	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	1	19	2	11%	17	89%
2015	4	101	4	4%	97	96%
2016	1	14	3	21%	11	79%
2017	1	16	1	6%	15	94%

*Source: ANSP, 2019*

It is striking to note the high number of students who took the ANSP courses designed for officers of private security companies and government contractors between 2014 and 2017. The Law on Private Security Services requires private security companies to only hire security officers/guards who pass a psycho-technical training course administered by the ANSP (according to Article 20, sections F and G).<sup>16</sup> This requirement also applies to all personnel contracted by government institutions to serve as security agents or officers, as stipulated in Article 8,

Sections G and H of the Law on Security Services of the Government, Autonomous Institutions, and Municipal Authorities.<sup>17</sup>

According to ANSP statistics, 193 courses of this type were offered between 2014 and 2017. From 2014 to 2017, a total of 6,521 agents for private security companies graduated from the ANSP, or an average of 1,630 graduates per year. Of this total, 5,746 were men (88.1%) and 775 were women (11.9%).

**TABLE 10**

**COURSES FOR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS, 2014-2017**

Year	Number of Courses	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	51	1,724	216	13%	1,508	87%
2015	43	1,199	101	8%	1,098	92%
2016	47	1,561	194	12%	1,367	88%
2017	52	2,037	264	13%	1,773	87%

*Source: ANSP, 2019*



Statistics show that between 2014 and 2017, the number of students who received training to be agents at private or state security companies increased relative to the number of students trained to be PNC officers (basic level). In both 2014 and 2015, the number of graduates from courses for agents for security companies was

more than double the number of PNC officers trained. In 2016, the figure was more than triple, and in 2017, the asymmetry became even more pronounced, as the ANSP trained more than four times as many people to become agents for security companies than as PNC officers.

**TABLE 11**

**COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS RECEIVING TRAINING TO JOIN THE POLICE AND TO BECOME AGENTS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND CONTRACTORS, 2014-2017**

Year	PNC Agents	Private Security Agents	Ratio of Private Security Agent Graduates to PNC Agent Graduates
2014	613	1,724	2.8
2015	501	1,199	2.4
2016	454	1,561	3.4
2017	477	2,037	4.3

*Source: Created by Iudop based on data provided by the ANSP, 2019*

ANSP information from 2014 to 2017 only shows training courses in the Philosophy of Community Policing taking place in 2014 and 2015: 60 courses in 2014 and a much smaller number (25) in 2015. All told, 1,727 students graduated from these courses, 374 of whom were women (21.6%) and 1,353 of whom were

men (78.3%). Notably, in 2015, the number of students who graduated from community policing philosophy courses dropped by 60% relative to 2014. These figures reveal a stark contrast to official government discourse that has publicly touted the PNC's adoption of a community policing model.

**TABLE 12**

**CONTINUING STUDIES COURSES: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNITY POLICING, 2014-2017**

Year	Number of Courses	Total Number of Students	Number of Women	Proportion of Women	Men	Proportion of Men
2014	60	1,256	270	21%	986	79%
2015	25	471	104	22%	367	78%

*Source: ANSP, 2019*

*\*No Philosophy of Community Policing course numbers registered for 2016 or 2017*

As of the completion of this report, no information regarding the evaluation processes

to which police officers are subjected had been provided.

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE POLICE


### CAPACITY FOR INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS

The PNC's current organizational structure has three units that supervise police activity: the

Oversight Unit, the Disciplinary Investigation Unit, and the Internal Affairs Unit. According to official PNC data, these units had a combined staff size of over 200 people each year from 2014 to 2017.

#### GRAPH 7

#### PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PNC INTERNAL OVERSIGHT UNITS, 2014-2017



Source: PNC, 2014-2018

Official PNC data show that the number of police personnel assigned to internal oversight units increased by a combined 26.3%, from 247 to 312 members, between 2014 and 2017.

Of these three units, the Internal Affairs Unit reported the largest increase in personnel during the 2014-2017 period, growing from 58 staff members in 2014 to 82 in 2017.

The increase in the number of personnel assigned to internal oversight units during this period corresponded with a decrease in the overall number of the police force. Accordingly, the ratio of total PNC personnel to personnel in oversight units decreased, from 113 in 2014 to 83 in 2017.

**TABLA 13****PROPORTION OF POLICE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PNC INTERNAL OVERSIGHT UNITS, 2014-2017**

Year	Total Police Personnel	Police Personnel Assigned to Internal Oversight Units	Ratio of Total Police to Number of Personnel Assigned to Oversight Units
2014	27,887	247	113
2015	22,480	237	95
2016	26,122	289	90.4
2017	26,025	312	83.4

Source: PNC, 2014-2018

According to official information, these oversight units have specific functions to monitor police activity. First, the Oversight Unit oversees how police services are organized and operate in accordance with the rules and regulations applicable to the police.<sup>18</sup> In other words, it monitors administrative aspects of the police services.

Meanwhile, Article 34 of the Police Discipline Law tasks the Disciplinary Investigation Unit with investigating severe (*grave*) and very severe (*muy grave*) disciplinary offenses (listed in Articles 8 and 9 of the same law) committed by police officers. Official PNC data from 2014 to 2017 shows that 543 disciplinary investigations for severe and very severe offenses were opened.<sup>19</sup>

**TABLE 14****DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED, DISAGGREGATED BY TYPE OF OFFENSE, 2014-2017**

Year	Type of Offense		Total Number of Investigations Initiated
	Severe	Very Severe	
2014	38	220	258
2015	6	17	23
2016	13	31	44
2017	159	59	218

Source: Information Request PNC-UAIP-102-2020

According to PNC data from this period, 1,578 members of the police were investigated, 92% of whom were men and 8% of whom were women.

The high percentage of males among those investigated may reflect the fact that men make up the majority of the police force.

**TABLE 15****POLICE PERSONNEL INVESTIGATED, DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER, 2014-2017**

Year	Personnel Investigated		Total
	Men	Women	
2014	403	29	432
2015	320	29	349
2016	370	40	410
2017	357	30	387

Source: Information Request PNC-UAIP-102-2020

As for the categories of the officers investigated from 2014 to 2017, official PNC statistics show that 83.4% were at the basic level, 8.1% at the executive level, 6.1% were administrative staff,

and 2.4% were at the superior level. Most officers who were investigated were in the lowest categories of the three levels of the police hierarchy.

**TABLE 16****POLICE PERSONNEL INVESTIGATED, DISAGGREGATED BY LEVEL AND RANK, 2014-2017**

Hierarchy Level	Rank	Year				Total by Level	Total by Rank
		2014	2015	2016	2017		
Superior Level	Commissioner	1	3	1	2	38	7
	Deputy Commissioner	6	6	8	11	38	31
Executive Level	Chief Inspector	1	2	0	4	127	7
	Inspector	16	4	8	8		36
	Deputy Inspector	28	20	18	18		84
Basic Level	Sergeant	23	8	23	30	1316	84
	Corporal	21	23	24	29		97
	Agent	324	263	278	270		1135
Administrative		12	20	50	15	97	97

Source: Information Request PNC-UAIP-102-2020

Meanwhile, Article 38 of the same law gives the Internal Affairs Unit the responsibility of investigating potential crimes committed by the police.<sup>20</sup> According to information on investigations conducted by the Internal Affairs Unit under the functional oversight of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (*Fiscalía General de la República, FGR*) between 2014 and 2017, 32.1% of the crimes committed over these four years were related to injuries. Another 12.5% were acts associated with the crime of theft, and a similar percentage were tied to threats (12.2%).

Other types of crimes that were investigated within the police force between 2014 and 2017 but which were less common were homicide (5%), sex crimes (5.3%), unlawful search and entry (3.6%), accepting bribes (meaning accepting any kind of gift or benefit in exchange for doing, delaying, or not doing a police duty) (2.7%), deprivation of liberty (2.7%), aiding in the evasion of (or imprisonment or a sentence) (1.9%), damage to property (1.6%), smuggling goods in prison centers (1.4%), and procedural fraud (1.3%).

It is noteworthy that acts such as threats, injuries, thefts, unlawful search and entry, procedural fraud, homicides (simple and aggravated), and deprivation of liberty all steadily rose over the period covered by this report.

Between 2014 and 2017, investigations carried out by the Internal Affairs Unit under the auspices of the FGR registered an increase of 18.6% in offenses related to theft, from 140 in 2014 to 166 in 2017. Investigations also increased for several other offenses, including: injuries by 24% (from 350 in 2014 to 434 in 2017); procedural fraud by 130% (from 10 in 2014 to 23 in 2017); unlawful search and entry by 163% (from 21 in 2014 to 71 in 2017); and threats by 162.5% (from 80 in 2014 to 210 in 2017).

Investigations into offenses related to deprivation of liberty and homicide increased by 200% or more during this period. Deprivation of liberty investigations increased from 16 in 2014 to 48 in 2017. Homicide investigations increased from 30 in 2014 to 94 cases in 2017.

**TABLE 17**

**INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC, 2014-2017**

Primary Offense	2014	2015	2016	2017
Threats	80	134	175	210
Injuries	350	384	409	434
Robbery	27	23	23	39
Theft	140	149	159	166
Blackmail	7	6	7	10
Arbitrary acts	36	36	33	34
Unlawful search and entry	27	32	46	71
Coercion	6	2	2	14
Bribery	39	31	29	32
Extortion	3	0	2	0

Primary Offense	2014	2015	2016	2017
Misappropriation or unlawful withholding/smuggling of goods	0	9	6	5
Damages	18	16	22	23
Disobedience of a judicial order	3	0	1	0
Illegal dissemination of information	1	2	2	2
Concealment	1	0	1	1
Fraud	6	6	8	4
Evasion of arrest	1	2	0	4
Ideological falsehood	1	1	2	5
Material falsehood	6	3	6	5
False testimony	1	4	1	0
Aiding in the evasion of arrest	24	25	23	23
Procedural fraud	10	14	15	23
Failure to fulfill duties	15	12	13	8
Peculation	3	2	3	1
Receiving stolen property	2	2	1	0
Illegal records or inquiries	1	0	3	6
Falsification of a crime	0	1	1	1
Discharge of a firearm	11	17	16	7
Illegal or irresponsible possession, carrying, or use of a firearm	22	30	28	18
Smuggling prohibited objects into penitentiaries	20	24	12	14
Homicide (aggravated or simple)	21	30	61	87
Attempted homicide, or conspiracy or proposition to commit homicide	9	9	16	7
Reckless driving of a motor vehicle	3	11	5	6
Manslaughter	2	4	2	4
Criminal Enterprise	6	14	5	6
Terrorist organizations	0	0	1	5
Torture	1	4	3	0
Deprivation of liberty	16	29	40	48
Intrafamily violence	9	8	3	0
Disobedience in cases of intrafamily violence	1	2	3	0
Femicide	1	0	0	1
Sexual harassment	17	9	19	16
Sexual assault	1	1	2	3
Statutory rape	6	5	2	2
Forms of violence against women	14	10	20	40

Primary Offense	2014	2015	2016	2017
Rape	18	17	8	16
Other investigations related to sex crimes	11	6	10	4
Other offenses	24	32	38	41
TOTAL	1,021	1,158	1,287	1,446

Source: PNC, Resolution 928-2019

## STATISTICS ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE POLICE

Some of the most serious signs of lapses in professionalism within the PNC are behaviors that completely violate the legal and ethical standards all police officers pledge to uphold and that contradict the values of police training.

As described previously in the Central America Monitor report on the human rights situation in El Salvador, there is empirical evidence of the

seriousness of the acts in which some members of the police have been implicated between 2014 and 2017.

Statistics processed by the UCA's University Observatory on Human Rights (*Observatorio Universitario de Derechos Humanos, OUDH*) on the number of complaints for crimes of torture committed by members of the police and military filed between 2014 and 2017 reveal the concerning fact that most of these crimes (73.8%) were attributed to members of the police.<sup>21</sup>

**TABLE 18**

### COMPLAINTS FOR CRIMES OF TORTURE FILED WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSPERSON, 2014-2017

Year	PNC Members Implicated	Members of the Armed Forces Implicated	Total Complaints
2014	6	6	12
2015	10	5	15
2016	7	0	7
2017	8	0	8

Source: PDDH, 2019

PNC records show that torture is not the only act in which PNC officers were implicated. The police force's own official records of the number of human rights violation cases perpetrated by members of the PNC that were referred to

the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic revealed that most of these cases are related to crimes against the person (homicide and injuries). A total of 333 cases of this type were recorded between 2014 and 2017.

**TABLE 19**

**CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS PERPETRATED BY PNC MEMBERS SUBMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL, 2014-2017**

Type of Case	Year of Submission to the FGR			
	2014	2015	2016	2017
Simple homicide	15	20	31	29
Aggravated homicide	6	10	11	29
Manslaughter	2	4	1	2
Attempted homicide	9	7	15	5
<b>Total homicide cases</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>65</b>
Injuries	25	13	32	28
Other types of injury cases	12	8	7	12
<b>Total injury cases</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>40</b>
Unlawful curtailment of freedom of movement	0	0	0	3
Torture	1	4	3	0
Femicide	1	0	1	1
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>109</b>

*Source: Information Request PNC-UAIP-117-2020*

The same report also stated that according to the Human Rights Institute of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (*Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, IDHUCA*), in 2016 there were multiple reports of a police procedure that violated Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”), where members of the police engaged in practices such as: severely beating people in their custody, death threats, putting the barrel of a gun in the mouths of or up to the heads of people in their custody, physical abuse, and insults.<sup>22</sup>

Procedural anomalies were also found in certain cases, allowing some police officers to remain at liberty and continue to perform their duties while the investigation was conducted, despite accusations of cruel treatment and serious injuries.<sup>23</sup>

The Central America Monitor report on human rights also highlighted the troubling OUDH data on use of lethal force by security forces in El Salvador. In 2014, 14.2 civilians died in “armed confrontations” for every 1 member of the police or military. The same statistic was 35 in 2015, 101.5 in 2016, and 136 in 2017.<sup>24</sup>



A recent SSPAS report covering international measures related to the use of lethal force indicated that, when security forces use appropriate force, data tends to show a ratio of 10

fatalities for every police officer or soldier killed in a confrontation. The aforementioned figures indicate that the use of lethal force by the PNC from 2014-2017 has been disproportionate.<sup>25</sup>

## TABLE 20

### RATIO OF CIVILIANS TO POLICE KILLED IN ARMED CONFRONTATIONS/ INCIDENTS, 2014-2017

Year	Number of Civilians Killed per Police Officer Killed
2014	14.2
2015	35
2016	101.5
2017	136

Source: PNC, Resolution 486-2018

Facts like these point to the urgent need for professionalization processes that urge members of the police force to adhere more

closely to working guidelines that respect citizens' fundamental rights, even in situations where people are breaking the law.


## CITIZEN TRUST IN THE PNC


The Salvadoran police should take immediate care to purge its ranks and shift toward a community policing model and training curriculum, as well as professionalize its force by eliminating illegal practices that seem to be a standard part of its operations. The PNC also needs to consider its image with the general public. Based on the annual surveys conducted

by the University Institute for Public Opinion at the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública-Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Iudop-UCA), from 2014 to 2017, approximately 6 out of every 10 Salvadorans had little to no trust in the police.

## GRAPH 8

### CITIZEN CONFIDENCE IN THE PNC, ACCORDING TO IUDOP PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS, 2014-2017





Prior Ludop-UCA studies have already warned how low citizen trust puts the legitimacy of institutions and the PNC's ability to do its job at risk.

*[...] distrust also thwarts efforts to resolve extreme conflicts and hinders peaceful social interactions. Lack of trust in institutions and the growing mass of citizens who are increasingly unsatisfied with the authorities' performance can, under certain circumstances, lead people to use unlawful means to defend themselves against crime, or lead them to commit crimes, with the idea that widespread impunity will shield them from punishment. In other words, distrust in institutions also becomes an incentive for criminals, as the chances of the law cracking down on perpetrators are seen as slim.<sup>26</sup>*

In 2016, research conducted by Ludop-UCA and the Kimberly Green Latin American and

Caribbean Center found that “51% of the population believes that the PNC is corrupt to some degree.<sup>27</sup> This research also highlighted that “reports of police abuse and misconduct are more frequent among residents of the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, among men, and among younger people.”<sup>28</sup>

Information compiled by the Central America Monitor points to the need for a diligent, professional, and impartial response from the authorities when investigating police misconduct and trying cases of it in court. This shift could change how citizens perceive the PNC, because “a police force with a geographical presence is important in order to generate legitimacy, authority, and citizen acquiescence,”<sup>28</sup> but that presence must always be in line with the protocols and laws in force to prevent the proliferation of patterns that affect people's fundamental rights.

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ANSP</b>	National Public Security Academy
<b>FGR</b>	Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic
<b>Idhuca</b>	Human Rights Institute of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University
<b>IES</b>	Higher Education Institute
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>Iudop</b>	University Institute for Public Opinion
<b>LAIP</b>	Public Information Access Law
<b>MJSP</b>	Ministry of Justice and Public Security
<b>ODAC</b>	Office of Citizen Services and Complaints
<b>ODUH</b>	University Observatory on Human Rights
<b>PDDH</b>	Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson
<b>PNC</b>	National Civilian Police
<b>SIF</b>	Seattle International Foundation
<b>UCA</b>	José Simeón Cañas Central American University
<b>UNIMUJER</b>	Specialized Institutional Unit for Women in Violent Situations
<b>WOLA</b>	Washington Office on Latin America

# ANNEXES

## ANNEX 1

### STRUCTURE OF PNC UNITS AND PROPORTION OF PERSONNEL AT BASIC LEVEL, DISAGGREGATED BY RANK, 2016-2017

Unit	Total Personnel	2016						Total Personnel	2017					
		Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit							Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit					
		Ser-geant	%	Cor-poral	%	Agent	%		Ser-geant	%	Cor-poral	%	Agent	%
<b>General Directorate</b>	62	1	1.6	0	0	13	21	63	0	0	1	1.6	17	27
Counsel	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Admissions and Promotions Tribunal	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	1	12.5	0	0
Communications Unit	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	10	22.7
Internal Auditing Unit	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional Contracting and Acquisitions Unit	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional Secondary Financial Unit	85	0	0	0	0	1	1.2	88	0	0	0	0	1	1.1
<b>Professional Responsibility Secretariat</b>	13	1	7.7	0	0	7	53.8	15	0	0	0	0	9	60
Oversight Unit	139	30	21.6	9	6.5	78	56.1	136	29	21.3	26	19.1	60	44.1
Disciplinary Investigation Unit	80	11	13.8	6	7.5	46	57.5	85	11	12.9	12	14.1	43	50.6
Internal Affairs Unit	62	9	14.5	5	8.1	33	53.2	82	10	12.2	15	18.3	38	46.3
<b>Technical Secretariat</b>	13	0	0	0	0	8	61.5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutional Planning Unit	29	0	0	0	0	1	3.4	31	0	0	0	0	2	6.5
Legal Unit	23	1	4.3	0	0	4	17.4	21	1	4.8	1	4.8	1	4.8
International Relations and Cooperation Unit	47	4	8.5	4	8.5	15	31.9	30	3	10	0	0	5	16.7
Telecommunications and Information Technology Unit	85	1	1.2	0	0	14	16.5	85	1	1.2	0	0	11	12.9
<b>Community Relations Secretariat</b>	18	0	0	0	0	2	11.1	18	0	0	0	0	5	27.8
Community Policing Unit	14	2	14.3	1	7.1	6	42.9	13	2	15.4	2	15.4	4	30.8

Unit	Total Personnel	2016						Total Personnel	2017					
		Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit							Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit					
		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%
Citizen Services Unit	12	1	8.3	2	16.7	6	50	12	1	8.3	2	16.7	6	50
Gender Unit	7	0	0	0	0	3	42.9	9	0	0	0	0	4	44.4
Human Rights Unit	24	2	8.3	1	4.2	16	66.7	25	2	8	8	32	10	40
Public Information Access Unit	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	1	8.3
Police Records and Backgrounds Unit	52	2	3.8	1	1.9	8	15.4	61	5	8.2	2	3.3	13	21.3
<b>General Subdirectorate</b>	35	1	2.9	2	5.7	10	28.6	37	1	2.7	4	10.8	10	27
Public Security Joint Command	36	0	0	3	8.3	18	50	32	2	6.2	2	6.2	13	40.6
Center for Police Information and Operational Control	90	4	4.4	2	2.2	39	43.3	108	9	8.3	2	1.9	48	44.4
<b>Public Security Subdirectorate</b>	45	0	0	2	4.4	23	51.1	52	1	1.9	2	3.8	23	44.2
911 Emergency Division	2000	49	2.5	57	2.85	1631	81.6	1950	45	2.3	67	3.4	1567	80.4
Land Transportation Division	1275	49	3.8	73	5.7	1037	81.3	1215	44	3.6	83	6.8	984	81
Border Security Division	513	40	7.8	34	6.6	379	73.9	499	38	7.6	42	8.4	366	73.3
Environmental Division	45	2	4.4	9	20	20	44.4	41	2	4.9	6	14.6	18	43.9
Prevention Division	47	4	8.5	0	0	20	42.6	41	4	9.7	0	0	17	41.5
Division for Registration and Oversight of Private Security Services	40	3	7.5	1	2.5	25	62.5	35	3	8.6	1	2.8	22	62.8
Tourism Police Division	162	1	0.6	1	0.6	137	84.6	202	3	1.5	5	2.5	169	83.7
<b>Investigation Subdirectorate</b>	75	1	1.3	1	1.3	46	61.3	77	1	1.3	3	3.9	48	62.3
Counternarcotics Division	580	37	6.4	26	4.5	427	73.6	563	36	6.4	58	10.3	384	68.2
Elite Division against Organized Crime	150	22	14.7	12	8	82	54.7	165	23	13.9	30	18.2	78	47.3
Central Division for Investigations	581	41	7.1	53	9.1	397	68.3	557	40	7.2	124	22.3	309	55.5
Anti-Gang Division	110	4	3.6	5	4.5	90	81.8	94	4	4.3	12	12.8	69	73.4
Anti-Extortion Division	206	15	7.3	11	5.3	161	78.2	202	15	7.4	22	10.9	146	72.3

Unit	Total Personnel	2016						Total Personnel	2017					
		Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit							Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit					
		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%
Scientific and Technical Police Division	292	12	4.1	9	3.1	160	54.8	295	11	3.7	37	12.5	133	45.1
Financial Crimes and Asset Recovery Investigation Division	48	4	8.3	2	4.2	33	68.8	50	4	8	6	12	30	60
Transnational Criminal Investigation Division	33	3	9.1	3	9.1	23	69.7	30	3	10	5	16.7	19	63.3
Central Information Processing and Analysis Unit	39	2	5.1	1	2.6	27	69.2	36	2	5.6	4	11.1	21	58.3
Transitional Anti Gang Center	49	1	2	4	8.2	37	75.5	49	1	2	13	26.5	28	57.1
National Central INTERPOL Office	42	6	14.3	3	7.1	14	33.3	48	7	14.6	5	10.4	18	37.5
Special Police Operations Group	67	11	16.4	3	4.5	49	73.1	67	12	17.9	6	8.9	44	65.7
<b>Intelligence Subdirectorate</b>	86	8	9.3	8	9.3	38	44.2	85	7	8.2	14	16.5	32	37.6
Information Collection Division	75	7	9.3	8	10.7	51	68	73	7	9.6	14	19.2	43	58.9
Intelligence Gathering and Analysis Division	38	1	2.6	1	2.6	28	73.7	34	1	2.9	4	11.8	22	64.7
Intelligence Operations Division	40	6	15	2	5	28	70	37	6	16.2	9	24.3	18	48.6
Counterintelligence Division	19	1	5.3	0	0	14	73.7	17	1	5.9	2	11.8	10	58.8
<b>Special Operations Subdirectorate</b>	237	4	1.7	10	4.2	193	81.4	249	5	2	14	5.6	193	77.5
Individual Protection Division	1542	18	1.2	21	1.4	319	20.7	1376	20	1.5	29	2.1	307	22.3
Witness and Victim Protection Division	73	5	6.8	5	6.8	38	52.1	67	3	4.5	5	7.5	36	53.7
Explosives and Firearms Division	107	5	4.7	14	13.1	68	63.6	101	5	4.9	21	20.8	59	58.4
Judicial Compliance Division	114	11	9.6	7	6.1	70	61.4	123	10	8.1	13	10.6	75	61
Order Maintenance Unit	340	13	3.8	23	6.8	274	80.6	337	13	3.8	95	28.2	198	58.7
Police Air Unit	41	1	2.4	1	2.4	11	26.8	39	1	2.6	1	2.6	14	35.9
Police Reaction Group	126	5	4	7	5.6	94	74.6	127	5	4	22	17.3	80	63
<b>Administration Subdirectorate</b>	26	1	3.8	0	0	8	30.8	34	2	5.9	1	2.9	6	17.6
Human Talent Division	138	5	3.6	5	3.6	21	15.2	133	5	3.7	8	6	19	14.3

Unit	Total Personnel	2016						Total Personnel	2017					
		Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit							Personnel at Basic Level, by Unit					
		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%		Sergeant	%	Corporal	%	Agent	%
Police Welfare Division	317	1	0.3	6	1.9	89	28.1	324	4	1.2	7	2.2	96	29.6
Logistics Division	255	0	0	0	0	8	3.1	252	0	0	1	0.4	9	3.6
Infrastructure Division	101	0	0	0	0	3	3	99	0	0	0	0	4	4
Institutional Assets Commissions	19	1	5.3	0	0	1	5.3	17	1	5.9	0	0	1	5.9
<b>National Offices</b>	5938	240	4	277	4.7	4340	73.1	6299	241	3.8	432	6.9	4521	71.8
Rural Stations	1451	36	2.5	25	1.7	1356	93.5	1453	33	2.3	28	1.9	1365	93.9
National Subregional Offices	4608	171	3.7	195	4.2	3871	84	4454	160	3.6	249	5.6	3698	83
National Stations	2777	168	6	165	5.9	2270	81.7	2752	169	6.1	200	7.3	2220	80.7
Telecommunications Interception Center	10	1	10	1	10	5	50	10	1	10	1	10	5	50
Police Ordinarate	12	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANSP Personnel	178	24	13.5	23	12.9	118	66.3	153	22	14.4	30	19.6	88	57.5
Regional National Disciplinary Tribunal	28	0	0	0	0	9	32.1	26	0	0	0	0	8	30.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>26122</b>	<b>1110</b>		<b>1150</b>		<b>18472</b>		<b>26025</b>	<b>1098</b>		<b>1809</b>		<b>17931</b>	

## ANNEX 2

### STRUCTURE OF IES-ANSP UNITS AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL, 2016-2017

No.	Office	2014	2015	2016	2017
		Total	Total	Total	Total
1	General Directorate	9	9	9	9
2	Gender Unit	2	2	2	2
3	Public Information Access Unit	5	2	2	2
4	General Archives Department	7	11	10	9
5	General Secretariat	4	4	4	5
6	Institutional Planning Unit	9	5	7	7
7	Internal Auditing Unit	6	6	6	8
8	Legal Counsel Unit	4	6	6	4
9	Disciplinary Complaints/Legal Unit	5	5	5	4
10	Institutional Financial Unit	15	15	15	15
11	Communications, Protocol, and Public Relations Unit	7	7	7	7
12	Institutional Contracting and Acquisitions Unit	12	11	11	11
13	Executive Sub-Directorate	3	3	3	3
14	Internal Regulations Unit	1	1	1	2
15	Background Check Unit	1	1	1	1
16	Center for Scientific Research	3	4	5	4
17	Administration Division	3	3	3	---
18	Information Technology Department	4	4	5	7
19	Systems Development Section	3	3	2	---
20	Communications and Systems Administration Section	2	2	1	---
21	Department of Health Services	28	31	31	31
22	Department of General Services	102	102	106	104
23	Department of Storage	9	11	11	8
24	Department of Maintenance	45	49	49	52
25	Department of Human Resources	11	13	10	10
26	Division for Studies	6	6	6	6
27	Executive Planning Unit	3	3	6	9
28	Educational Facilitation Section	1	1	1	---
29	Academic Education Subdivision	4	4	---	---
30	Department of Initial Training	57	57	56	74
31	Online Training and Job Placement Section	---	---	6	---
32	Department of Specialized and Remedial Courses	8	7	6	---
33	Department of Promotions	13	12	10	---
34	Department of Private and Contracted Security Services	6	7	7	---
35	Department of Extracurricular Training	2	1	1	---



No.	Office	2014	2015	2016	2017
		Total	Total	Total	Total
36	Academic Administration Subdivision	2	2	3	3
37	Department of Academic Administration	---	---	---	4
38	Department of Vacancies, Candidate Selection, and Admissions	6	6	7	7
39	Psycho-pedagogical Cabinet	12	12	13	---
40	Department of Academic Registrations	6	7	8	---
41	Department of Resources for Training Assistance	23	22	22	---
42	Academic Counseling	---	---	---	8
43	Department of Academic Development	---	---	---	15
44	Department of Continuing Studies	---	---	---	19
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>449</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>450</b>

# NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup>A detailed list of indicators is available at [www.wola.org/cam](http://www.wola.org/cam).
- <sup>2</sup>Costa, G. (1999) National Civilian Police of El Salvador. 1st edition. Processes and Structures Collection. Minor Series. Volume No. 29. UCA Editors: San Salvador.
- <sup>3</sup>Costa, G. (1999) National Civilian Police of El Salvador.
- <sup>4</sup>Costa, G. (1999) National Civilian Police of El Salvador.
- Silva, H. (2014) *Infiltrated: Chronicle of Corruption in the PNC (1992-2013)*. 1st edition. UCA Editors: San Salvador.
- Aguilar, J. (2016) *The Role of the Military in Internal Security in El Salvador: the exceptional becomes permanent in the re-conceptualization of violence in the Northern Triangle. Approach to security in the northern triangle countries of Central America from a democratic perspective*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Asociación Equipo Maíz: San Salvador.
- <sup>5</sup>Silva, H. (2014) *Infiltrated: Chronicle of Corruption in the PNC (1992-2013)*. 1st edition. UCA Editors: San Salvador.
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- <sup>6</sup>Legislative Assembly (1992) Organic Law of the National Civilian Police. Legislative Decree No. 269, Official Gazette No. 144, Volume No. 316, August 10, 1992. Retrieved from: <https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/> on July 17, 2020.
- <sup>7</sup>Legislative Assembly (2001) Organic Law of the National Civilian Police. Legislative Decree No. 653, Official Gazette No. 240, Volume No. 353, December 19, 2001. Retrieved from: <https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/decretos/details/3320> on July 17, 2020.
- <sup>8</sup>Legislative Assembly (2008) Police Discipline Law. Legislative Decree No. 518, Official Gazette No. 10, Volume No. 378, January 16, 2008. Retrieved from: <https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/decretos/details/2146> on July 17, 2020.
- <sup>9</sup>Legislative Assembly (2014) Organic Law of the Inspector General for Public Security. Legislative Decree No. 815, Official Gazette No. 202, Volume No. 405, October 30, 2014. Retrieved from: <https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/> on July 17, 2020.
- <sup>10</sup>University Institute for Public Opinion [Iudop] (2014) *The Security and Justice Situation 2009-2014. Between Expectations of Change, Iron Fist Military and Gang Truces*. Retrieved from: [http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/libro\\_la\\_situaci%C3%B3n\\_de\\_la\\_seguridad.pdf](http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/libro_la_situaci%C3%B3n_de_la_seguridad.pdf) on July 7, 2020.
- <sup>11</sup>WOLA-Iudop (2020) *Fighting Organized Crime in El Salvador*. Central America Monitor.
- <sup>12</sup>Legislative Assembly (1992) Organic Law of the National Public Security Academy. Legislative Decree No. 195. Official Gazette No. 42, Volume No. 314 of March 3, 1992. Retrieved from: [https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117\\_072936976\\_archivo\\_documento\\_legislativo.pdf](https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117_072936976_archivo_documento_legislativo.pdf) on August 4, 2020.
- <sup>13</sup>Executive Branch (2017) Creation of the Specialized Higher Education Institute named “National Public Security Academy.” Executive Order No. 151. Official Gazette No. 158, Volume No. 400 of August 29, 2013. Retrieved from: <https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/> on August 8, 2020.
- <sup>14</sup>Ministry of Education (Mined) (2017) Approval of the Statutes of the Higher Education Institute, “National Public Security Academy”. Executive Decision No. 15-0422 Education Division. Official Gazette No. 79. Volume No. 415 of May 2, 2017. Retrieved from: <https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/> on August 8, 2020.
- <sup>15</sup>Legislative Assembly (1996) Police Career Law. Legislative Decree No. 773, Official Gazette No. 144, Volume No. 332, August 7, 1996. Retrieved from: [https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117\\_072937660\\_archivo\\_documento\\_legislativo.pdf](https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117_072937660_archivo_documento_legislativo.pdf) on August 9, 2020.
- <sup>16</sup>National Public Security Academy (ANSP). 2019. *Statistics on Admission, Initial Training Graduations, Promotion Courses, Specialty and Refresher Courses, Police Science Technology Courses and other courses*. Retrieved from <https://www.transparencia.gob.sv/instituciones/ansp/documents/estadisticas> on July 21, 2020.
- <sup>17</sup>Legislative Assembly. 2001. Law on Private Security Services. Legislative Decree 227, D.O. N° 18, Volume N° 350. January 24, 2001.
- <sup>18</sup>Legislative Assembly. 2001. Law on Security Services of the Government, Autonomous Institutions, and Municipal Authorities. Legislative Decree 226. D.O. N° 18, Volume N° 350. January 24, 2001.
- <sup>19</sup>Legislative Assembly (2008) Police Discipline Law. Legislative Decree No. 518.
- <sup>20</sup>Legislative Assembly (2008) Police Discipline Law. Legislative Decree No. 518.

- <sup>21</sup>Resolution 52-2019 of the Office of the Public Defender for Human Rights.
- <sup>22</sup>Human Rights Institute of the UCA [Idhuca] (2017). Human Rights Report 2016. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved from: <http://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/wp-content/uploads/Informe-de-derechos-humanos-2016-Idhuca.pdf> on September 2, 2019.
- <sup>23</sup>Human Rights Institute of the UCA [Idhuca] (2018). Human Rights Report 2017. Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights. San Salvador, El Salvador. Retrieved from: [http://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/wp-content/uploads/IDDHH2017\\_-\\_](http://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/wp-content/uploads/IDDHH2017_-_)
- <sup>24</sup>Idhuca (2018), Human Rights Report.
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## **ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS**

**THE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC OPINION (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, IUDOP)** is a research center based at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) in El Salvador. In collaboration with other areas of the university, the IUDOP seeks to systematically and scientifically monitor the social, political, economic, and cultural situation of the country.

**THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (WOLA)** is a leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas. We envision a future where public policies protect human rights and recognize human dignity, and where justice overcomes violence.

## **ABOUT THE PROJECT**

The Central America Monitor is a subregional project that seeks to assess the level of progress being made by the countries of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in the areas of strengthening the rule of law, reducing violence, combating corruption and organized crime, and protecting human rights through the use of a series of indicators. The project also monitors and analyzes international cooperation programs in the aforementioned areas.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

We would like to thank the Latin American Division of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Seattle International Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, and the Moriah Fund for their financial support and excellent advice that has made this project possible.

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