Nearly three years into President Gustavo Petro’s term, his flagship “Total Peace” initiative is faltering. On this episode of the WOLA Podcast, Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, WOLA’s Director for the Andes, provides a sweeping overview of Colombia’s peace and security reality.
Petro entered office seeking to negotiate with armed groups nationwide. But as Sánchez-Garzoli details, those groups’ fragmentation, growing distrust, and overwhelmed government institutions have left most processes stuck or deteriorating. Meanwhile, implementation of the 2016 peace accord with the FARC is far behind schedule. Violent incidents are rising sharply, armed groups are expanding territorial control, and communities face dire humanitarian consequences.
Nine simultaneous processes – and little coordination: The Petro government is “simultaneously juggling nine processes at once”, including six negotiation processes with armed groups and three socio-legal dialogues with urban gangs. Ceasefires are only partially enforced, and the government lacks “a legal framework” to implement agreements with urban groups, leaving talks in limbo.
Negotiations with ELN: expanded presence, collapsed trust: The ELN’s presence has expanded from 99 municipalities in 2016 to over 183 today. A side negotiation with a splinter ELN front is moving forward, but undermined overall trust. As Gimena notes: “They had signed after six rounds of negotiations, 28 agreements… but basically things ended up falling apart with Petro, the high commissioner, [ELN negotiator] Pablo Beltrán, all attacking each other of all sorts of things in a very non-negotiable way.”Though Petro proposed restarting talks in the Vatican this May, momentum has stalled as ELN units engage in violent territorial disputes, especially in Chocó, Cauca, Catatumbo, and Arauca.
Among FARC dissidents, fragmentation deepens complexity: Groups led by rearmed or dissident FARC leaders had been largely massed into two major factions, the EMC (Estado Mayor Central) and the Segunda Marquetalia. Both groups have undergone subsequent internal splits. Negotiations with EMC yielded a “temporary location zone” (ZUT) for the 33rd Front in Catatumbo to demobilize while talks continue, but concerns abound.
2016 Peace Accord implementation is moribund: Nine years after signing, only 34 percent of the 2016 Peace Accord’s 578 commitments have been completed, with 38 percent showing minimal progress and 9 percent not initiated, according to Notre Dame University’s Kroc Institute. Gender and ethnic components lag furthest. Sánchez-Garzoli notes that Petro’s government has mostly worked to “reverse the delays of the previous administration” rather than advance new initiatives.
Violence is surging in key regions:
- Catatumbo: Record coca cultivation contributes to battles between the ELN and FARC dissidents. In early 2025 alone, 106 people were killed, including social leaders and civilians. Groups’ use of drones to surveil and attack rivals represents an alarming new battlefield tactic.
- Chocó: ELN and Gulf Clan violence confines communities, while Gulf Clan collusion with security forces deepens fear. ELN is acting as a “parallel state”, handing out ID cards and enforcing checkpoints.
- Cauca: June attacks included 24–30 coordinated bombings and shootings, attributed to hardline FARC dissidents targeting indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities’ leadership structures. Humanitarian agencies face access restrictions in 28 of Cauca’s 42 municipalities, threatening lifesaving aid.
Urban dialogues have made fragile progress: Socio-legal talks with gangs in Buenaventura, Medellín, and Quibdó have temporarily reduced homicides, but extortion remains rampant. A lack of legal frameworks prevents municipal authorities from formally engaging.
Overwhelmed state capacity: The Petro administration lacks a functioning “peace bureaucracy” with sufficient personnel and budget; coordination among processes, as armed groups adjust behavior based on talks elsewhere; and a complementary security strategy, as peace negotiations alone cannot replace security policy.
Sánchez-Garzoli explains: “Your total peace can’t be your security policy. You need to have peace and security efforts complement each other.”
Upcoming elections, polarization, and U.S. disengagement: With 13 months left in Petro’s term, upcoming elections risk increasing violence and policy paralysis. The Trump administration’s cuts to U.S. aid compound instability, especially funding for accord implementation, humanitarian and migrant-integration programs, ethnic communities, and human rights defenders.
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