With Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency on January 20, Latin America faces a transformative and turbulent period in its relations with its neighbor to the north. Trump’s first term was defined by transactional dealings, economic pressure tactics, and sidelining human rights for short-term political gains—a pattern that could intensify in his second term.
Trump’s nominations, including Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, Christopher Landau as Deputy Secretary of State, and the quick appointments of U.S. ambassadors to several Latin American countries, such as Mexico, indicate that the region will be a higher U.S. foreign policy priority, especially regarding migration and illicit drugs. Trump’s growing alignment with populist, often authoritarian leaders in Latin America, such as Argentina’s Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, and the Bolsonaro family in Brazil, could embolden anti-democratic actors and threaten the region’s democratic institutions, civil liberties, citizen security, and human rights protections.
Under a second Trump administration, WOLA anticipates significant setbacks to democratic norms, civic space, human rights protections, judicial independence, inclusion and diversity initiatives, and climate crisis response.
There could be disagreement with historic allies on long-standing bipartisan strategies to address protracted issues such as internal armed conflicts and organized illegal armed groups. Prioritizing militarized drug enforcement strategies and restrictive immigration policies, along with a preference for transactional diplomacy at the expense of other issues, risks further entrenching authoritarianism, leaving civil society actors, human rights defenders, and reform-minded officials under greater threat.
As democratic norms and institutions come under increasing attack, and as commitments to diversity and inclusion weaken, it will be even more important to foster solidarity and coordination among civil society actors across the region and beyond. This will be essential to resisting the erosion of democratic freedoms and protecting human rights and the rule of law.
WOLA has outlined key areas of concern and potential countermeasures to address these risks.
Migration
Even as the Biden administration placed the U.S. asylum system out of reach for many migrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, it did open up and preserve other pathways to protection—and protection from deportation—in the United States. Programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), and humanitarian parole status for citizens of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela could be terminated under Trump. Additionally, legal migration routes, such as the Safe Mobility Offices, which offer screening and processing for potential pathways for certain migrants currently in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala, including for refugee resettlement, could also shut down.
Trump’s focus on mass deportation, likely employing military personnel domestically in ways unprecedented in modern U.S. history, could eject millions of people from the United States through sweeps and raids, internment in staging camps, and large-scale removals. A renewed “Remain in Mexico” program could send tens of thousands of asylum seekers to await their U.S. proceedings inside Mexico if the Mexican government is compelled to agree to it. Nonprofits and charities that assist and defend migrants may find themselves under concerted legal attack. Border wall construction will recommence. U.S. border and migration forces, like Customs and Border Protection (CBP), its Border Patrol component, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), will see their already troubled organizational cultures worsen amid weak, permissive oversight, risking increased misuse of force and other abuses. Preventable tragedies, ranging from family separations to uprooted lives to brutal treatment in custody and detention, appear likely to multiply.
As blocking migration becomes the paramount U.S. foreign policy priority in the Americas, the U.S. relationship with the region will distort further. Mexico and other countries along the route may face more pressure to block migrants and accept more deportees from third countries, while their economies struggle to absorb large numbers of their own removed citizens. Nations throughout the region will experience higher numbers of migrants and asylum seekers within their borders, worsening a humanitarian crisis in a hemisphere where more than 20.3 million forcibly displaced and stateless people, a third of them from Venezuela, are now in need of international protection. U.S. assistance to other countries’ border and migration forces may increase, risking a replication of the abuse-prone, barely accountable organizational culture at CBP and ICE, which deliver most training and advice to foreign counterparts. Meanwhile, corrupt and authoritarian leaders—perhaps including the regime in Venezuela—may find that they can curry U.S. favor by accepting deportees and cracking down on migrants.
Mexico
Trump has proposed U.S. military action in Mexico, such as deploying U.S. special forces on Mexican soil, as a potential response to drug trafficking—an idea that has gained traction more broadly within the Republican party. It is hard to overstate the human rights risks of such proposals or the potentially catastrophic impact of unilateral U.S. military action on the U.S.-Mexico relationship. But even if U.S. military action does not materialize, such proposals foreshadow a relationship in which threats of unilateral measures may well be the starting point for dialogue in such crucial areas as security and migration, leading to counterproductive outcomes rather than effective policy solutions.
Decades of a militarized “war on drugs” in Mexico have failed to protect Mexico’s population from violence and curb illicit drug use in the United States, but they have resulted in serious human rights violations. Rather than a focus on drug enforcement and interdictions, effectively addressing crime in Mexico instead requires reducing impunity and corruption. To the extent that the Trump 2.0 administration prioritizes harmful militarized actions that look ‘tough’ on crime or the border, little room may be left for cooperation in the areas actually relevant to strengthening the rule of law, protecting the population, and reducing forced migration.
Venezuela
Recent developments raise questions about whether the Trump administration’s approach to Venezuela will be similar to the policies of his first administration. On January 9, for the first time since Venezuela’s July 2024 presidential elections, Trump addressed the situation in a brief post on Truth Social. His message came one day before Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for another six-year presidential term, without any evidence to back the legitimacy of his alleged victory and amidst strong condemnation from the international community. Trump referred to Edmundo González Urrutia as elected president and highlighted the support he received from the Venezuelan-American community. Secretary of State appointee Marco Rubio emphasized during his confirmation hearing in Congress that the country is controlled by a narcotrafficking and criminal organization, criticized the Biden administration for being manipulated into diminishing sanctions and providing millions of dollars to Maduro through oil licenses, and highlighted the significant geopolitical risks involved in Venezuela’s dealings with countries like Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, Michael Waltz, who has been named Trump’s national security advisor, met with González Urrutia during his recent visit to Washington D.C., but in his capacity as a Florida Congressman, leaving the administration’s stance on Venezuela unclear. Trump also appointed Richard Grenell to be a presidential envoy for special missions, including Venezuela, but it is yet unclear what his stance is and how his position will articulate with that of the State Department.
After Trump’s election victory, Maduro publicly congratulated him and expressed hope for a “win-win” relationship. While it seems unlikely that diplomatic relations between both countries will be re-established, the incoming administration faces difficult dilemmas that could open the doors to a transactional approach from both governments. Maduro is likely to focus on retaining oil licenses granted by OFAC, which made Venezuela the third-largest U.S. oil supplier in 2024. Meanwhile, Trump wants to curb migration by resuming deportation flights to Venezuela. These overlapping interests, despite ideological differences and inflammatory narratives, could signal a shift away from the maximum-pressure tactics of Trump’s first term, with economic pragmatism taking center stage, but signals on U.S. future foreign policy are mixed. Senior advisor Tom Homan’s recent remarks, emphasizing that he expects that Trump “will work with Venezuela” in receiving these deportation flights, stand in contrast to the historically hardline positions taken by Rubio and Landau on Venezuela, raising new questions about the future of the relationship between both countries.
Colombia
With the support of the United States, Colombia has made great strides in addressing its internal armed conflicts over the past two decades. We are far from the Colombia of the 1980s, where both conflict and drug violence were out of control. The 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) pivoted Colombia towards solutions-based approaches that are more sustainable in the long term for addressing the root causes of conflict, violence, and illicit economies. However, it is also clear that Colombia’s extensive inequality requires addressing the lack of state presence in remote areas and impoverished urban centers. Afro-descendant, Indigenous, and rural communities require targeted, differentiated approaches that include their active participation.
While some progress has been made, serious security, drug trafficking, human rights, and humanitarian problems persist in Colombia. Notable rights violations include the high number of murders and attacks against social leaders, particularly environmental defenders, internal displacement, and the lack of justice in most cases. While it remains unclear what policies the incoming Trump Administration will adopt toward Colombia, it is evident that the lessons from the past cannot be ignored. Returning to harmful, ineffective policies that characterized the first years of “Plan Colombia,” like a hardline security approach to combat drugs—which often leads to abuses—will not solve the problem of illicit economies. Irresponsible statements, ideological rhetoric, and verbal conflicts should be avoided, as the U.S.-Colombia bilateral relationship is mutually beneficial. Colombia is the U.S.’s primary partner in addressing migration from Venezuela and also a key commercial partner that prioritizes the U.S. over China
Central America
Although Trump has not yet proposed specific measures for Central America, his administration is likely to dismantle the Biden administration’s U.S. Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration, the Central America Forward Initiative, the Partnership for Central America, and the Vice President Harris-led Call to Action. U.S. engagement with the region will shift drastically. The new administration is unlikely to prioritize addressing the underlying driving factors of migration such as violence, insecurity, poverty, and climate change–issues exacerbated by endemic corruption and weak governance in the region.
U.S. initiatives that have aimed to protect civic space and amplify the voices of human rights defenders will not be a priority. Corrupt actors who have undermined democracy and were sanctioned by the Biden Administration–such as many Guatemalan officials–are likely to be empowered by Trump and his allies, who have strong ties with many of them. This could lead to a rollback of sanctions and an exacerbation of political instability. On the other hand, we are likely to see ongoing pressure from Republicans in Congress and the administration on President Xiomara Castro in Honduras, given concerns about policies that are impacting U.S. businesses and her ties with Venezuela, Cuba, China, Nicaragua, and other U.S. adversaries.
Despite these challenges, there is room for positive change in the case of Nicaragua as there is bipartisan support and interest in restoring democracy in the country. Furthermore, the private sector in Central America and the U.S. could play a key role in urging the Trump administration to implement investment initiatives, promote legal certainty, uphold the rule of law, and respect for democratic values.
Cuba
In his first term, and at the urging of Marco Rubio, President Trump rolled back many of the policies of engagement with Cuba put in place during the Obama administration, imposing new sanctions, suspending working groups on issues ranging from environmental cooperation, migration, and human rights, and placing Cuba back on the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) list shortly before leaving office. Biden reversed some of these policies, such as facilitating family reunification and remittances, expanding authorized travel, and supporting Cuba’s private sector and internet freedom. Prompted by a crippled economy, widespread shortages of energy, food, fuel, and medicine, and increased repression, amongst other factors, we have seen a historic level of Cuban migration since 2022. Cuba also remained on the SSOT list until Biden’s last days in office, which was lifted the same day that the Cuban government announced the release of 553 people imprisoned in Cuba.
With Marco Rubio poised to become U.S. Secretary of State and other Cuba-American hardliners likely to occupy key positions in the administration and in Congress, the limited engagement established during the Biden administration with Cuba will end. Although the administration should raise concerns about the human rights situation in Cuba and push for the release of all those unjustly detained and the respect and guarantee of fundamental civil liberties following the dramatic uptick in repression following the July 11, 2021 protests, this should not be paired with another increase in restrictions on Cuba, which have only worsened the humanitarian crisis on the island and failed to advance meaningful political reforms.
Drug Policy
Drug overdose deaths in the United States are finally going down after having increased for years. This promising decline is likely due to many factors, including the federal government’s unprecedented support for expanding access to life-saving harm-reduction tools like the overdose-antidote naloxone. During Trump’s first term, overdose deaths caused by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl quadrupled, but his administration failed to embrace harm reduction strategies. Now, with the first signs that drug overdose deaths are falling, Trump should intensify federal support for harm reduction, not abandon it. Since 2008, more than 1 million Americans have died from drug overdose. Even with the recent good news, the toll of overdose deaths remains shockingly high. Walking away from harm reduction now would imperil these first signs of progress, to the detriment of all Americans.
Despite the decades-long abject failure of U.S.-led drug enforcement operations to curb overseas illegal drug supplies and seal U.S. borders, politicians across the political spectrum continue to support approaches that sound “tough” even though they’ve proven to be not merely ineffective but counterproductive, making illegal drugs more toxic and drug markets more lethal. Trump’s threat to impose steep tariffs on Mexico and the mainstreaming among Republican lawmakers of proposals for U.S. military strikes on Mexican territory are setting the tone for a coercive, militarized U.S. approach to the region. Such tactics can be expected to deliver big on drug war theatrics–crop eradication tallies, drug seizures, “kingpin” arrests–generating plenty of visuals that Trump can use to paint a mirage of drug-control success. But such operations are powerless to actually diminish drug supplies or to check the reach and power of drug trafficking networks and organized crime. Worse, militarized drug enforcement will predictably trigger devastating consequences, notably increased violence and bloodshed in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such misadventures will leave a trail of destroyed lives and communities, and deliver no benefit where it matters most to Americans–reducing the toll of drug overdose.
Climate Crisis
Climate change is already wreaking havoc, upending and destroying lives in communities across the globe, including in the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean. More severe droughts and wildfires, more intense storms and floods, and the ravages of rising seas are today’s reality, not some vague concern for the remote future. Without concerted international action, the devastation will only increase. The United States is by far the largest historical emitter of carbon dioxide and therefore bears significant responsibility for creating the climate crisis. By contrast, Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole have minimal historical responsibility for planet-warming emissions, but residents of these countries are highly vulnerable to climate-driven disasters. Yet Trump is threatening to pull the U.S. government out of the landmark Paris Agreement to respond to climate change, as he did in his first term. Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress seem determined to curtail all U.S. international climate aid, including assistance to protect the Amazon rainforest. These would be tragically short-sighted moves and grievous self-inflicted wounds, ceding climate leadership to other countries, including China, and hampering global efforts to reduce carbon emissions and to cope with the terrifying realities of our warming planet.
The traumatic consequences of the climate crisis are already on vivid display across the U.S. landscape, and the destruction wrought by climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean will pose mounting challenges across the region, including due to increased displacement and migration. The United States cannot seal itself off from those regional consequences. All Americans have a stake in U.S. engagement to help prevent global temperatures from rising even further. Supporting our neighbors in the Americas to build resilience to climate shocks and to recover from the damage should be understood to be both a moral and practical imperative for every U.S. government–including the incoming Trump administration.
Gender and Racial Justice
We anticipate this administration will curtail U.S. government efforts to advance gender justice, diversity, inclusion, and the protection of vulnerable groups in both U.S. foreign policy and within the State Department. The reinstatement of the Mexico City policy is expected, limiting U.S. assistance to organizations involved in abortion services or advocacy for changes to abortion laws.
These shifts may exacerbate structural inequalities and undermine U.S. interests at home and abroad. Addressing reproductive health and the specific needs and challenges faced by gender, ethnic minorities, and vulnerable populations makes countries stronger commercial partners and helps mitigate illicit economies. Victims of trafficking, sexual abuse, domestic and gender-based violence require protection. Likewise, increased participation and equal rights for women and ethnic minorities fostera innovation through the inclusion of different perspectives and makes the country better prepared to address complex global challenges. Initiatives like the U.S.-Colombia Racial Action Plan and Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality (JAPER) demonstrate the importance of advancing rights and economic opportunities including the incoming administration.
Conclusion
For at least the next two years, Trump will have a Republican-controlled Congress that will advance several of his priorities, particularly his restrictive immigration agenda, and realign, if not reduce, areas of U.S. assistance, with a focus on security aid, eliminating or dramatically cutting funding for international bodies, and countering the role of China globally. As Trump gears up for a second term, Latin America faces the prospect of deepened authoritarianism, growing human rights challenges, and a further erosion of democratic principles with many leaders likely to find an ally in the new U.S. administration for their conservative agendas. The international community, together with civil society in Latin America, must brace for these challenges and work together to uphold human rights, protect democratic institutions, and resist authoritarian influences.