The United States has intensified its military pressure on Venezuela, while Nicolás Maduro’s regime continues its systematic repression and commits serious human rights violations. Venezuelans, both inside and outside the country, are caught in the middle of this complex tension and a barrage of messages riddled with misinformation.
The U.S. government has no plausible justification for attacking Venezuela. Doing so would constitute a flagrant violation of the prohibition on the use of force, except in cases of self-defense or with the authorization of the UN Security Council.
The history of U.S. military intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean should serve as a warning about the possible implications of an action that may not lead to the democratic transition the people of Venezuela desire and for which they expressed themselves forcefully and peacefully in the 2024 elections. Actions of this kind could not only put U.S. soldiers at risk but also further erode the U.S. relationship with other countries in the hemisphere.
Given the enormous risks this strategy poses to the Venezuelan people, the United States, and the rest of the Americas, it is crucial that decisions made by the United States be based on facts and careful consideration, centered on the rights of Venezuelans and their quest for a democratic transition. With this in mind, WOLA offers this resource to dispel misinformation and provide a solid foundation for U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela.
- Under an authoritarian regime, the human rights situation in Venezuela is critical
Venezuela remains under a deeply authoritarian regime led by Nicolás Maduro, whose control is based on sustained repression, arbitrary detentions, and systematic human rights violations. Following the July 2024 presidential elections—in which Maduro declared himself the winner despite overwhelming evidence that he lost—the government intensified its crackdown on dissent.
The International Criminal Court has an open investigation into Venezuela, and the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission has concluded that there is a “state policy (…) to silence, discourage, and stifle opposition to the government,” as well as individuals perceived as opposition. The organization Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón (JEP) has documented the cases of at least 1,074 people who remain arbitrarily deprived of their liberty for political reasons, including people suffering from serious illnesses without receiving any treatment. Ninety-seven of these people are foreign nationals (49 foreigners and 48 people with dual nationality). According to the Press and Society Institute (IPYS), 18 journalists and media workers are detained, and freedom of expression is at its lowest point.
Through local partners, WOLA is aware of at least 176 people who have been forcibly disappeared, including people who have been recently detained and whose whereabouts are unknown, as well as people who were already in detention and have been transferred to other detention centers without a court order or notification to family members about the new detention center.
Understanding this context of human rights violations is key at a time when Maduro is presenting himself as a “victim” and taking advantage of U.S. military actions to intensify the closure of civic space.
Maduro reported having signed a decree, which is not public, declaring a “state of external commotion.” In addition, he has ordered the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) to apply the highest level of citizen surveillance through VenApp, a mobile application used to repress civil society after the July 2024 elections. Added to this is a proposal to strip the nationality of a list of Venezuelan individuals, following in the footsteps of the dictatorships of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
2. Venezuela is rife with illicit economies, and corruption is entrenched in its institutions. However, some of the U.S.’s allegations are not supported by evidence.
Some of the arguments on which the U.S. administration has based its deployment of naval forces in the Caribbean Sea and its extrajudicial killings are not supported by evidence. As we have pointed out in the past, based on reports from U.S. government agencies themselves, it is possible to determine that Venezuela is not a source of fentanyl nor the main place of origin of cocaine that transits through the Caribbean corridor to the United States.
The U.S. administration has confusingly used references to Tren de Aragua and the Cartel of the Suns as if they were interchangeable terms and has employed hyperbole and half-truths about these groups. Nor is it true that there has been an attack against the U.S. that would support the argument of self-defense.
Most surprising is that the human rights violations, corruption, and links to illicit economies by Nicolás Maduro’s de facto government are so serious that they do not require these exaggerations, which, on the contrary, delegitimize the struggle of a population seeking democratic change. This, however, does not justify U.S. military action in Venezuela.
Venezuela ranks 178th out of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 10/100. While oil has remained Venezuela’s main source of income, the dismantling of democratic institutions in the country, coupled with the imposition of sanctions on the oil sector, has strengthened corruption and the flow of money from illicit economies, such as illegal mining and drug trafficking. For years, U.S. government agencies, think tanks, and local organizations have documented how actors from Venezuela use complex transnational systems and shell companies to hide assets derived from these economies and from corruption. Independent courts have investigated and convicted Venezuelan officials and their relatives for their links to drug trafficking.
As Transparencia Venezuela and Insight Crime have documented, illicit economies, particularly drug trafficking, permeate Venezuelan institutions. Drug trafficking from Venezuela operates largely in Colombian border areas. For years, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has pointed out that corruption and impunity in Venezuela contribute to a permissive environment for armed groups and hinder anti-narcotics efforts in Colombia. Insight Crime has described the National Liberation Army (ELN), a binational group of Colombian origin, as the most significant criminal group in Venezuela and has documented how it has gained control of territory in some areas of the Venezuelan-Colombian border, especially in Apure state.
3. The U.S. is committing extrajudicial killings in the Caribbean
The relevant authorities in the Trump administration have not provided information on who was on board the boats that were attacked by the military in international waters. As independent UN experts have explained, even if it were proven that these individuals were engaged in criminal activity, the response should have been their interdiction and detention, not their killing.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, rejected the U.S. argument that the attacks, which left 70 people dead, were covered by international humanitarian law, which governs armed conflicts. The U.S. is not in armed conflict with Venezuela or with groups in that country. Türk explained that the fight against drugs is a matter of public order, in which the lethal use of force is subject to the limits imposed by international human rights law. In such cases, lethal force can only be used as a last resort and as a means of defense when there is an imminent threat to life.
4. The implications of the U.S.’s actions go far beyond Venezuela
Due to the serious human rights situation and the deep economic and humanitarian crisis in which the country is mired, the opposition leadership in Venezuela views military actions in the Caribbean through the lens of the possibility of a democratic transition, after having attempted multiple rounds of negotiations, protests, nonviolent methods of struggle, pressure from the international community, and participation in elections, despite the lack of free and fair conditions.
However, the potential negative impacts of this strategy, not only in Venezuela but far beyond, are being overlooked. First, it could serve as justification for further criminalizing the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population in the U.S. and support the invocation of the Alien Enemies Act, which has so far been blocked by the courts.
Second, it sets a dangerous precedent at a time when there are already threats of lethal force against alleged drug traffickers in other countries, such as Mexico.
Third, if the strategy fails and Maduro remains in power, the closure of civic space and internal repression will be even worse, prolonging the suffering of the people of Venezuela and the conditions that give rise to forced migration from that country, which are exacerbated by the impact of U.S sectoral sanctions.
Fourth, the U.S. has a very negative history of military interventions in Latin America, and an attack on Venezuelan territory could eventually generate more regional rejection and allow Maduro to present himself as a victim of aggression, despite his long record of human rights violations.
Fifth, military actions have not been authorized or supervised by Congress, which contributes to undermining the rule of law in a context of growing democratic erosion in the U.S.
5. The term “terrorism” must be used responsibly
There is no binding definition of what constitutes “terrorism” in international law. However, under international human rights standards, the term is limited to criminal acts intended to kill, injure, or take hostages in order to intimidate the population or coerce a government or organization into doing or refraining from doing something. The objectives pursued by terrorism are political or ideological and have a direct effect on the exercise of human rights, democracy, and peace.
It is precisely the lack of a clear definition of the term “terrorism” that has allowed human rights violations to be committed in the name of the fight against it. At WOLA, for example, we have highlighted the complexity of the Trump administration’s decision to designate several criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Using this term for organizations that pursue economic rather than ideological goals, as in the case of the Tren de Aragua, dilutes the seriousness of its connotation. Designating a group as terrorist can expand the state’s powers to surveil, detain, and use force, often at the expense of civil liberties. As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) rightly pointed out in a report on terrorism and human rights, the lack of definition of the term “does not mean that it does not constitute a form of unspeakable violence or that states are not subject to restrictions, under international law, in shaping their responses to violence.”
Furthermore, under U.S. law, designation as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) or Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) does not constitute authorization to use force or a declaration of war. Such designations allow for the deportation of members of the group, the prosecution of individuals who provide material support to the group, the confiscation of assets, and the freezing of bank accounts.
What should U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela consist of?
The Venezuelan people have the right to live in freedom and should have the international support necessary to rebuild their democratic institutions. The means sought to achieve this should not be detrimental to democracy in the U.S. On the one hand, according to publicly available official data, the United States went from investing $37 million in democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela in 2024 to canceling assistance in 2025. Congress should fund democracy and human rights programs for Venezuela within the United States’ foreign assistance for fiscal year 2026 and support international organizations that investigate human rights violations and expose those responsible within the Maduro regime.
At the same time, it is more necessary than ever for the U.S. government to design a robust, coherent, and long-term foreign policy toward Venezuela. It is important to work together with other democratic countries, exert pressure on the Maduro regime through legal channels (for example, through the fight against corruption), and create another space for negotiation that leads to the de-escalation of internal repression and democratic opening in Venezuela—not a negotiation that perpetuates the status quo. In our most recent report on Venezuela (July 2025), we present more specific recommendations for the Trump administration and Congress.
