Venezuela’s Democratic Resistance: Challenges and Prospects for 2025

Laura Cristina Dib, Director for Venezuela at WOLA

Laura Cristina Dib

Laura Cristina Dib, Director for Venezuela at WOLA

Laura Cristina Dib

Director for Venezuela

Laura Cristina Dib is the Venezuela Program Director at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), where she works with...
Alex Bare - Program Associate

Alex Bare

Alex Bare - Program Associate

Alex Bare

Program Associate

Alex Bare is a Program Associate for Colombia, Drug Policy, and Venezuela at WOLA, providing programmatic support in areas including...

The inauguration of Donald Trump’s second term on January 20 brought renewed speculation about what 2025 might hold for Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro’s iron-fisted grip on the country is set to go on for another six-year term, despite the clear lack of legitimacy and all the international community’s efforts to negotiate a democratic transition. Opposition leader María Corina Machado remains steadfast in her conviction that this is a struggle “to the end.” The situation on the ground, however, is less rosy. With over 1,600 people in jail for political reasons, Chavismo has shown no qualms about crushing protests, criminalizing civil society, and arresting anyone who shows dissent.

As we look ahead to 2025, WOLA sat down with Juanita Goebertus Estrada, director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch, and Mariano de Alba, an international law specialist. Together, we take stock of the efforts underway to produce a democratic transition and resist the ever-shrinking civic space in Venezuela. We also explore the potential approaches of the Trump administration and other international actors, alongside the pitfalls of “easy” solutions.


I. The July 28 election weakened Maduro’s legitimacy, even if it didn’t produce a transition.

It’s tempting to dismiss the opposition’s coordinated efforts to produce a democratic transition via the electoral path as naïve or a waste of time. After all, despite the time and effort the international community poured into negotiations with Chavismo, Maduro and his supporters stole the elections anyway. But history is not a straight line. The July 28 election may still prove to be a critical stepping stone in producing the democratic transition that Venezuelans overwhelmingly voted for.

The presidential election revealed cracks in Maduro’s traditional support base. As Juanita Goebertus highlighted in our conversation on January 23, “It is now a regime that survives solely on the power of arms, having lost its legitimacy—even among the working-class neighborhoods of Caracas that had historically voted for Chavismo. According to the results published in the official records, Edmundo González achieved a significant victory, even in those neighborhoods.” 

The Maduro government has reacted to this lack of international legitimacy by isolating itself from Western nations and rebuffing the efforts of its neighbors to intermediate. For international relations expert Mariano de Alba, this isolation should not be taken as a sign that the regime’s collapse is imminent. “I believe Maduro’s government has faced similar situations in the recent past, over the last ten years, and through various tactics, it has managed to, let’s say, catch its breath again.” In this case, that breath has come in the form of backing from non-Western states, both large (Russia and China) and small (Cuba and Turkey, to name a few).

II. The opposition must maintain a unified, clear-eyed approach while developing innovative strategies in a new chapter of authoritarianism.

Under the leadership of María Corina Machado, the Venezuelan opposition now enters a new, more unpredictable chapter of authoritarianism. While her campaign was widely viewed as effective despite the circumstances, the opposition needs to constantly recalibrate to adapt to Venezuela’s authoritarian drift. Most importantly, the opposition must create spaces for effective internal coordination—“This is a time to avoid internal infighting and to prevent repeating past mistakes of division and self-destruction,” warns Goebertus.

To weather this new chapter of authoritarianism, Mariano de Alba underscores ways the opposition could recalibrate in the immediate future. One critical step is reinvigorating organizing efforts inside Venezuela. With Edmundo González exiled, the opposition has shifted resources to engage international forums. This diplomatic marathon, while important for maintaining pressure, has “placed excessive emphasis on international efforts, somewhat neglecting the work that still needs to be done internally. There is still so much that needs to happen on the ground.”

A crucial shift that could facilitate change would be to refresh the opposition’s structure, which now risks becoming too rigid. “Given the repression, the leadership of the Venezuelan political opposition has maintained a very vertical approach to leadership. I think it’s time to rethink that,” says de Alba. In authoritarian contexts like Venezuela, success hinges on the opposition’s ability to employ diverse and creative tactics. Relying on a single strategy risks stagnation.

III. The role of civil society and internal resistance remains critical.

Venezuelan civil society—long a pillar of resistance against the country’s ascent into autocracy—has been battered by the aftermath of the July 28 elections. “The sentiment in Venezuela right now is one of deep fear, driven by brutal repression,” offers de Alba. “So, if it was already difficult before and the space for civil society was limited, now it has become much harder—though not impossible.”

There is still much to lose in terms of civic space, and the U.S. and other international actors must keep that at the forefront in their response to the situation. Once that space is lost, so will many of the efforts to document human rights violations and support victims. To de Alba’s dismay, much of the West’s response since Maduro was sworn in on January 10—sanctions leveled at top officials—missed the mark. “I feel they ultimately end up being largely symbolic. The sanctions target them directly, but it’s likely that others, such as frontmen or associates, are the ones actually managing the money or traveling abroad on their behalf.”

Instead, Western democracies should prioritize the support of civil society. “I believe the main task of the international community, particularly the West, is to make a concerted effort to reopen civic space in Venezuela. That must be their priority.”

IV. It remains unclear what the Trump administration’s strategy will be. But there are some things it should certainly avoid.

While the first days of the Trump administration have given some inklings as to their stance on Venezuela—notably a post from special envoy Richard Grenell—the jury is still out on what their ultimate approach will be. Policy differences within the Trump administration, such as those between hardliners like Marco Rubio and more pragmatic MAGA factions, may shape the U.S. approach to Venezuela.

If Marco Rubio has his way, we might see a return to the maximum pressure campaign pursued by the first Trump administration in 2019. But would it work? Mariano de Alba has doubts. “It’s hard to say. There are elements to consider, though, particularly the fact that in its initial form, maximum pressure did, to some extent, strengthen the Maduro government internally, especially with the armed forces. Maduro was able to frame the situation as if he were under attack by an international conspiracy, which helped rally support. Additionally, it opened doors and brought Maduro’s government closer to non-Western international actors. These alliances are now playing a significant role in keeping Maduro’s government financially afloat.”

Or perhaps, as some have suggested, Venezuela hawks might decide that the time is ripe for a boots-on-the-ground intervention. Juanita Goebertus sees a major problem with this. “I would say there is no appetite in the United States for a military venture of any kind. Trump was elected, in general, with the goal of reducing U.S. involvement in international military interventions.”

There is also the question of whether a military intervention would work. De Alba, again, is skeptical. “The risk of these operations, even though they may seem highly unlikely—as Juanita already pointed out—is that if they go wrong, as happened with the 2020 Operation Gideon, they could backfire. They could further entrench Maduro’s government and give it more momentum. And if such an operation were to succeed, it’s crucial to acknowledge that, as a Venezuelan, it would be tragic, because many innocent Venezuelans could lose their lives in such confrontations.”

There are no clear indications that the Trump administration is moving towards either of these options. But what Richard Grenell’s post does hint at is they are open to dialogue with Maduro. Herein lies a possible path forward that could produce fruits, according to de Alba. “The strategy cannot be to isolate the government entirely, saying ‘we don’t want to deal with them at all.’ No, no, no. What the international community can do is precisely to engage and see what can be achieved.” To what degree there is a coordinated effort within the Trump administration to engage, however, is unclear.

The path of dialogue, however, is littered with pitfalls. “I am deeply concerned that the more pragmatic wing, including the pro-oil lobby within Trump’s close coalition, could end up prevailing,” notes Goebertus. “This could lead to a ‘deal between strongmen’ that allows Trump to claim he was pragmatic in reducing migration, while sidelining everything else.”

V. Conclusion

Venezuela is drifting in uncharted waters. Even still, millions of Venezuelans remain in the country and voted for democracy. The international community must not forget them. “Building a new window of opportunity to foster a democratic transition in Venezuela requires a series of coordinated measures aimed at creating incentives that ultimately make it more costly for Nicolás Maduro’s regime to stay in power than to step aside,” says Juanita Goebertus. “That’s what can eventually drive a transition.” 

In addition to combatting a sense of fatigue related to Venezuela, the country’s strife should not be externalized. Building and strengthening internal mechanisms on the ground is key to combating the authoritarian playbook. Finally, related to this last point is the role of civil society. It is not possible to conduct an objective, evidence-based analysis of the political, economic, and human rights situation without civil society documenting the reality on the ground. International actors should remember that, although besieged by repression and criminalization, there are still civil society organizations, organizers, activists, and journalists in Venezuela that require support to preserve civic space. 

Now is not the time to throw in the towel.

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