Crisis Unveiled: Making Sense of CND67 for Drug Policy Reform

Remarks by John Walsh

Director for Drug Policy and the Andes at the Washington Office on Latin America
International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) Webinar
April 8, 2024

Since its inception in 1946, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) has approved 475 resolutions, an average of six per year.

So this year’s output, five resolutions, was a bit below average.

But the CND in March 2024 was anything but average. This year felt different and was different.

Antony Blinken was the first U.S. Secretary of State to participate at the CND in Vienna.

Secretary Blinken’s presence shows that the CND’s work is a priority for the United States. The unprecedented participation in Vienna of the top U.S. diplomat also shows, I think, that the Biden administration realizes the U.S. needs to work harder to gain international cooperation.

First, let’s be clear: the CND is not a household term in the U.S. But the U.S. has prioritized the CND since its inception.

The U.S. and Russia/U.S.S.R. are the only two countries to be continuous members of the CND since 1946.

And while no Secretary of State has taken part in CND until now, President Bill Clinton spoke at the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in New York. And President Donald Trump led a “Global Call to Action” on the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2018.

But in 2024, the reason for Secretary Blinken’s presence was obvious: it’s about fentanyl and overdose deaths.

As the latest Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) figures show, overdoses are a genuine public health emergency in the United States.

Overshadowed for a time by the terrible toll of COVID, the surge in overdose deaths is undeniably a big deal today.

And fentanyl is potentially a political liability for President Biden and Democrats in an election year.

In this context, it’s important to credit the Biden administration for adopting harm reduction. To be sure, all previous U.S. administrations set the bar tragically low.

But the Biden administration’s stance matters domestically, and it matters internationally. So credit where it’s due.

At the same time, it’s also important to emphasize that there’s a cavernous gap between the massive need for life-saving harm reduction interventions in communities across the country and the sparse reality of harm reduction services.

Finally, it’s important to consider the Biden administration’s approach to fentanyl in view of the proposals of today’s Republican Party under the sway of Donald Trump.

With many Republican politicians weaponizing immigration and the U.S.-Mexico border, proposals to launch missile strikes or even invade Mexico have moved from the fringe to mainstream MAGA.

By comparison, the Biden administration touts the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and diplomacy to lower tensions with China and improve drug cooperation.

And the Biden administration has now led a CND resolution on overdose prevention and response. By my count, early drafts of the resolution included seven mentions of harm reduction, including in the title.

In taking its resolution unresolved to the CND plenary—with harm reduction language still included, albeit with only one mention of the term remaining—the U.S. must have known that a vote was possible, and even probable.

A few other factors were at play as the scene was set for voting on the resolution:

• The U.S. doesn’t seem to mind being on the other side of a UN vote from Russia. And vice versa.
• The U.S. delegation was helped by its partners—especially Colombia—to hold firm.
• U.S. officials were no doubt aware that a very different U.S. president may be calling the shots at the March 2025 CND. If the U.S. opted for consensus and removed any mention of harm reduction rather than take the resolution to plenary and a likely vote, there might not be another opportunity anytime soon.

Now I’d like to offer some reflections on the “spirit of Vienna” and the “Vienna consensus.”

If the “spirit of Vienna” means a commitment to seeking international cooperation to address shared challenges, that sounds good to me.

And in the abstract, the idea of finding consensus sounds positive, too.

At a time when our differences seem to define us—both within and across countries—the prospect of consensus can feel comforting and even inspiring.

But this warm glow around the idea of consensus—especially the “Vienna consensus” begs some crucial questions:

• Consensus on what and for what?
• Does the supposed consensus truly exist?
• Is achieving true consensus really necessary for useful international cooperation?

The 1998 UNGASS sought to rally countries around creating a so-called “drug-free world.”

Even if we accept that there was genuine consensus on the aim of a drug-free world in 1998, it was clearly developing cracks.

Twenty years ago, in 2004, WOLA and our colleagues at the Transnational Institute published a report entitled Cracks in the Vienna Consensus.

If cracks were apparent 20 years ago, deep fractures are evident today.

Despite the hostility of the U.S. and other countries to the term and the reality of “Harm Reduction,” it has not gone away, but rather become ever more relevant and urgent.

To appreciate the fact that the U.S. just led a resolution that contained the words “harm reduction,” it’s worth recalling the 2004 letter from the executive director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to U.S. State Department official Robert “Bobby” Charles, sent the day after the two met.

We don’t have a transcript of that meeting, but from the UNODC’s “Dear Bobby” letter, it’s easy enough to imagine what might have been discussed.

UNODC’s director wrote:

“On the general issue of ‘harm reduction,’ I share your concern. Under the guise of ‘harm reduction’ there are people working disingenuously to alter the world’s opposition to drugs. These people can misuse our well-intentioned statements for their own agenda, and this we cannot allow. Accordingly, and as we discussed in our meeting, we are reviewing all our statements, both printed and electronic, and will be even more vigilant in the future.”

Decades of U.S. intransigence regarding harm reduction have cost the world dearly, including the people of the United States.

The Vienna consensus has also been fracturing over the rising—and overdue—prominence of human rights in the Vienna drug debates.

And of course, some countries have decided at the national level to legally regulate access to cannabis for non-medical uses, and other countries, including the U.S., are trending in that direction.

The mythical “Vienna consensus” had survived by papering over these growing differences and polarized debates, presenting a façade of basic agreement even as differences have grown more pronounced.

The “Vienna consensus” had become a “fake” consensus.

It’s long past time to replace a pretend consensus with honest debates and recognition of real differences.

On that note, I’d like to quote Brazilian scholar Matias Spektor, who recently gave a magnificent lecture at the Brookings Institution in Washington:

“We must let go of the expectation that countries grappling with the evolution of the global legal order will coalesce around some kind of moral consensus. In a world of multiple centers of international power and authority, all we can hope for is heated deliberation, a lot of contestation, and—if lucky—uncoerced persuasion. A world where the major powers of the day confront each other in international institutions, through the language and tools of international law is a good one.”

Perhaps a new “Vienna consensus” will one day arise that’s worth celebrating—hopefully one built on human rights, peace, and sustainability.

For that day to arrive, the old consensus has to give way. Time will tell how significant the events of March 2024 will prove to be. Just a few weeks later, they feel very significant.