On September 2, President Trump announced from the Oval Office that a ship loaded with drugs had been downed in the Caribbean Sea by a missile strike and that 11 people had died in the operation. Questions have arisen given the lack of information about the attack launched by the U.S. military, specifically regarding the legality and proportionality of the use of lethal force in this case. At the same time, Venezuela’s authoritarian government has maintained an environment of sustained repression, carrying out new arrests and forced disappearances, and has increased the presence of the military and civilian militias in the country. As explained below, these recent events are part of a context of increased tension between the U.S. and Venezuela and the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean Sea, which goes beyond efforts to control drug trafficking.
Since 2005, the US government has complained about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation in the fight against drugs. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that this non-compliance, coupled with a permissive atmosphere in Venezuela, limited the U.S.’s ability to prevent the flow of narcotics from Colombia to Venezuela. The dismantling of democratic institutions in Venezuela and widespread corruption have allowed illicit economies to flourish with the consent, complicity, and participation of those in power. In 2016, a New York district judge sentenced two nephews of Cilia Flores, Venezuela’s first lady, to 18 years in prison for trafficking cocaine to the United States. Thus, the Venezuelan government’s links to drug trafficking and the accusations made by the United States are neither new nor partisan.
In the era of political spectacle, the Trump administration has used a mixture of reality and theater to exert greater pressure on the authoritarian government of Nicolás Maduro. On August 8, the New York Times reported that President Trump had authorized the Pentagon to use military forces in the fight against drugs. Shortly before, on July 25, the Treasury Department had designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). The name Cartel de los Soles refers to the network of relationships between Venezuelan government officials and drug traffickers. At the beginning of the Trump administration, the Venezuelan criminal gang Tren de Aragua was also designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Although with different legal implications, and without these designations expressly authorizing the use of military force, this framework has served to justify the deployment of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean Sea.
The decision to combine designations that place Venezuela’s authoritarian government within the framework of a terrorist organization, the increase in the reward to $50 million for information leading to the arrest of Nicolás Maduro under the Narcotics Rewards Program (NRP), and the military deployment in the Caribbean reinforce the U.S. strategy of placing the Venezuelan crisis in the realm of national security. While the measure puts pressure on an authoritarian government that lacks democratic legitimacy, the analysis of the situation in Venezuela should not be done in a vacuum, without considering the lessons learned from the outcome of the war on drugs in the region.
The sequence of measures adopted by the United States has raised questions about the scope and possible consequences of the naval deployment. It’s impossible to predict what Washington’s next steps will be and how Nicolás Maduro will react, beyond his rhetoric and an attempt to demonstrate strength by flying over American ships with military aircraft. Based on the information available so far, we answer here some key questions about the situation.
What are the links between Venezuela’s authoritarian government and illicit economies?
The designation of the Cartel de los Soles has reignited a debate about its organizational nature and structure. Various analyses question whether it is a cartel with its own distinctive characteristics or a flexible network of state and non-state actors involved in criminal activities. This debate distracts attention from an essential element: the existence of deep links between senior Venezuelan government officials and various illicit economies, including drug trafficking, fuel trafficking, illegal mining, and the smuggling of gold, rhodium, and coltan.
Transparencia Venezuela, an organization recently forced into exile due to political persecution, estimated that illicit economies would generate approximately $9.402 billion in revenue by 2022. Cases like those of former military officer Clíver Alcalá Cordones and former diplomat and director of Military Intelligence, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, who were sentenced to prison for drug trafficking in the U.S., have revealed the links between Venezuelan authorities and drug trafficking.
Why is the approach that links drug trafficking with terrorism problematic?
The definition of terrorism contained in Executive Order 13224, issued by President Bush after the attacks of September 11, 2001–which is the legal basis for the designation of the Cartel de los Soles as a SGDT–includes activities that are violent or dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure, with the intent to intimidate the civilian population, influence the policy of a government by coercion, or affect its conduct through acts of mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
The inclusion of drug cartels under this definition has been the subject of debate. As WOLA has pointed out, labeling criminal organizations as terrorists is problematic for several reasons, starting with the fact that cartels have economic rather than ideological objectives, and the very definition of what constitutes a drug cartel is vague. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has explained that some terrorism laws used in the fight against drugs are often vague, overly broad, and can distort the definition of crimes, creating ambiguities that make it difficult to differentiate between common crimes and terrorist acts. This can result in violations of the principle of legality.
In the case of Venezuela, the debate is even more complex, since, unlike criminal groups in Mexico or Colombia, the U.S. government has singled out Nicolás Maduro as the head of the cartel. So, although various U.S. officials have stated that they have no interest in carrying out “regime change” or entering into new military conflicts, the formal indictment of Nicolás Maduro opened by U.S. courts in 2020, coupled with the measures adopted by the executive branch, opens the door to punitive and potential military action.
What are the implications for the political opposition in Venezuela?
Although the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean could, at least temporarily, limit the use of some routes for these illicit economies operating from Venezuela, the actions also aim to undermine a government without democratic legitimacy. Such illegitimacy was solidified in 2024, when co-opted institutions in Venezuela disregarded the election results, thus consolidating an authoritarian government characterized by serious human rights violations and a system of impunity that enables criminal networks to operate.
For the Venezuelan opposition, led by María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, Washington’s “maximum pressure” approach has been interpreted, in part, as a success. The designation of the Cartel de los Soles and the U.S. military deployment dispel some doubts that existed at the beginning of the Trump administration about a purely transactional approach to bilateral relations. In turn, these measures hinder attempts at international “normalization” of the Maduro regime. However, the U.S. military deployment has also contributed to a renewed rapprochement between Maduro’s de facto government and governments such as Brazil and Colombia, with which there was a rift in 2024 due to their calls for electoral transparency, and who are now joining in a call for respect for Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty.
For the opposition, it is important to create defections within the ruling coalition through external pressure and isolation. Today, there are at least 170 documented cases of military personnel who are deprived of their liberty, and repression reduces the incentives for other actors to break with the regime. In this sense, in addition to the “stick” of military threat, communication channels are needed that offer incentives for protection to those willing to abandon the power structure, along with transitional justice mechanisms that guarantee victims’ rights and facilitate a negotiated and sustainable exit.
On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the contradictions in Trump’s foreign policy toward Venezuela. While exerting great pressure on Maduro, some adopted measures have had the opposite effect, while others put Venezuelans who have fled the country at risk. The freezing of foreign aid has had a serious impact on independent civil society in Venezuela; the end of legal pathways for Venezuelans in the U.S. and the continuation of deportation flights ignore the risk they face in their country of origin; and the granting of the oil license to Chevron was done without adopting mechanisms to circumvent the regulatory framework that facilitates opacity in Venezuela.
The U.S. pressure strategy is also not without risks. In recent years, Venezuelan society has employed nearly every mechanism of resistance: social protests, strikes, several rounds of negotiations, international pressure, and participation in electoral processes, even without guarantees. There is no certainty that the Trump administration’s current measures will lead to political change and bring the country closer to a democratic transition, and as we have highlighted previously, they could be used as a pretext by Maduro for further repression. They could even have a double negative effect: greater international fatigue with regard to the Venezuelan crisis and erosion of the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. as a central player in the region with the capacity to influence Venezuela.
Is there a possibility of military escalation in the region?
While it is impossible to predict the decisions that the Trump administration will make, some scenarios can be considered. The deployment of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean is a costly and high-profile operation that is difficult to sustain over time. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has insisted that this is an anti-narcotics operation. Although the measure can be understood as a deterrent, the possibility of it evolving into more direct military action cannot be ruled out. The nature and scope of such eventual actions are, however, uncertain.
It remains to be seen what the reaction of the region will be and whether political positions will translate into military action. While the governments of the Dominican Republic, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina, and Ecuador have adopted statements and measures pointing to the designation of the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization, some Caribbean countries, Brazil, and Colombia have taken the opposite position, denouncing the U.S. actions as interventionist.
A scenario of gradually escalating tensions seems quite likely in this context, understood as a continuous process that could range from military pressure intended to intimidate, through selective attacks, to more aggressive efforts aimed at overthrowing the regime by military means, which seems less likely, although not impossible. The sinking of a civilian vessel, possibly with a missile, in the Caribbean, announced by President Trump himself, and the subsequent overflight of U.S. vessels by Venezuelan military aircraft, seem to fall somewhere between the first two levels, suggesting a possible sustained push towards further escalation of tension, but this will also depend on the actions taken by Maduro and the position taken by the international community.
How does the resilience of criminal networks threaten the sustainability of a long-term democratic transition?
One of the biggest challenges in the Venezuelan case is the resilience of the criminal network that supports the authoritarian government ruling from Caracas. The search for a democratic transition must take this into account. The departure of key figures such as Nicolás Maduro or the Minister of the Interior, Justice, and Peace, Diosdado Cabello, would not necessarily lead to the automatic dismantling of these networks; and the possibility of realignments that could prolong their influence will depend on the characteristics of a transition and the ability of an incoming government to regain control over the security and law enforcement forces.
Other actors linked to illicit economies operate in Venezuelan territory: the National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident factions of the FARC, as well as mining unions, armed “colectivos”, and organized crime structures, including the Tren de Aragua and the pranato. The density of this criminal ecosystem poses a considerable challenge for any transition scenario. If a transition scenario were to occur, regaining control of the territory from these groups would not be an easy task and would require the collaboration of the affected communities, the work of experts, resources, and coordinated international support.
Conclusions
The U.S. naval deployment and designations under the terrorism framework are part of a broader strategy that combines legal, financial, diplomatic, and military tools to increase pressure on those in power in Venezuela.
However, these measures carry significant risks: if they fail to achieve progress toward democratization, they may strengthen the Maduro government’s narrative of resistance, increase international fatigue, and further complicate the path to transition. In this scenario, Maduro has increased the militarization of the country and, with it, repression and political persecution.
There is no magic or simple solution to the Venezuelan situation. The real challenge is not only to bring about a change in leadership, but also to dismantle a criminal network rooted in the Venezuelan state. Ignoring this reality could lead to partial or unsustainable solutions. Hence, the importance of offering appropriate incentives to create rifts among those in power, because the U.S. military presence alone is no guarantee of the collapse of the Maduro government.
Ultimately, international pressure will only make sense if it translates into a process that combines effective incentives to fracture the ruling coalition with guarantees of justice and reparation for victims. Venezuela’s future will depend on the ability to articulate both elements, avoiding both the perpetuation of the regime and the reproduction of the criminal and corrupt dynamics that sustain it.
